Professor Madawi Al Rasheed

by Daryl Champion . London: Hurst and Company.  2003. Pp.xxii+392glossary, index, bibliography. £ 45 (cloth) , £16.95 (paper), ISBN 1-85065-647-9 casebound, 1-85065-668-1 paperback. 

The intimate connection between Saudi Arabia and oil not only influenced historical development in this country but also left its fingerprints on Western scholarly work in the humanities and social science disciplines. More than any other country in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia polarised the academic community and created a rift between those who justify its alleged ‘exceptionalism’ and those who condemn its archaic and odd social, political, religious and cultural traditions. In this polarised scholarly atmosphere sound interpretation tends to be the first casualty.  With a number of exceptions, indigenous research in general has not so far produced nuanced interpretations either.

Such research is mainly conducted under the auspices of an authoritarian regime, which is always hostile to critical interpretations and vigorous analysis, except that which confirms its own legitimacy, grandiose narratives and mythologies.  Some Saudi scholars turned out to be more ‘orientalists’ than the ‘orientalists’, whom they regularly denounced for their misrepresentations of the country, its culture, society and political system.  In such work, primitive nationalism, combined with a revulsion against exposing the ‘secrets’ of state and society to the outside world allowed misguided claims about the country to flourish, One such claim that is becoming louder and louder under the pressure of globalisation, mass communication and a more than usual outside interest motivated by recent violence and terrorism against Westerners states that Saudi Arabia is comprehensible only to Saudis.  Saudi academics, policy makers and political activists adopt this attitude, while outsiders reiterate arguments about the country’s alleged uniqueness, for example escaping colonialism, developing a ‘puritanical’ Islam, engaging in a rentier political system, and advancing rapidly at the material level while at the social level remaining backward, conservative and eccentric. Such arguments lead to attributing any current political upheaval, social ills, religious conflicts and cultural disjunctions to an alleged ongoing battle between the forces of ‘tradition’ and the forces of ‘modernity’. Unfortunately and despite the dismantling of such old theoretical paradigms, these arguments are still fashionable not only among journalists, politicians, think tank advisors, but also scholars.

In the political economy of scholarship on Saudi Arabia, The Paradoxical Kingdom is a refreshing reconsideration of old paradigms and a re-evaluation of well-rehearsed and exhausted models, the most known of which is that of the ‘rentier state’, at a time when scholars thought the rentier state was functional or currently as it is believed to have entered a phase of ‘dysfunctionality’, a term proposed by Champion. . Political economists initially claimed that the rentier state was functional when it applied a redistributive economy, rewarding allegiance and buying off opposition. Under such paradigm, oil became the key factor for understanding everything that was “Saudi”, from conspicuous consumption to political acquiescence. Today, under different circumstances, for example globalisation, the rentier state has become dysfunctional, thus political reforms demanded by a less than happy population are urgent.

Like the scholarly generation of the late 1970s, Champion ‘over’ privileges the economic foundation of Saudi Arabia, namely oil rents, which have become in the minds of many observors the most important determining factor in the development of the country during the second half of the twentieth century. While not underestimating the centrality of oil rents, there is more scope for understanding Saudi Arabia through other prisms (for example the historical, social, cultural, and political), which can assume an autonomous analytical status and should be treated as such rather than be subjugated in an over-reductionist manner to the moulding hand of oil. Champion expands the analysis as he ventures into areas often ignored by political economists.

The central thesis of this book revolves around what the author calls ‘asabiyya capitalism, by which he means a kind of capitalism flourishing within a cultural and social milieu that privileges kinship links. For Champion, ‘asabiyya capitalism ‘promotes an environment in which acts that are regarded as overtly corrupt in the West, flourish’ (pp. 11). Such acts include nationals who are part of the privileged ‘asabiyya patronage networks. They act as ‘agents, brokers and middlemen between foreign business or industry and the Saudi state in the negotiation and award of contracts’ (ibid.).  Middlemen charge a commission as a percentage of the total contract value in return for their services. Such role seems to be mastered by princes especially those who play key political roles, allowing them to translate political office into economic power.  To mention one example, Defence Minister Sultan ibn Abd al- Aziz reaps colossal profits from commissions on weapons sold to the Saudi governments.

Champion seems to think that ‘asabiyya capitalism is a development that accompanied the oil economy. While the processes elaborately described by Champion are so well documented in this book, the use of the concept of ‘asabiyya is unfortunate. The genealogy of the original Ibn Khaldun’s concept of solidarity, initially introduced into the vocabulary of contemporary Western discourse on the Arab world by Ernest Gellner, privileges blood ties which are considered as essential determinants of political and social behaviour in the Arab world.  Champion seems to extend the meaning of ‘asabiyya to involve a regional dimension when he discusses developments such as the ‘Najdisation’ of the state whereby he imagines that a regional central Arabian solidarity is now the backbone of the regime. This regional solidarity manifests itself in monopolising state bureaucracy, the economy and decision making. In some accounts, this ‘Najdisation’ is also extended to the domain of culture, social tradition and religious interpretation. Supported by statistical evidence from other studies, Champion concludes that the Saudi state is a Najdi state, a claim which is also dominant in opposition discourse especially that in the Hijaz and the Eastern Province.

The concept of ‘asabiyya, especially the tribal and familial variants is subjected to serious re-evaluation by anthropologists to the extent that it is now regarded as an anachronism.  Historically and anthropologically, tribal ‘asabiyya and later so-called familial ‘asabiyya proved to be nothing more than rhetoric, which is always invoked but only occasionally adhered to by social actors. Schisms within one social group, whether a tribe or a family, were the norm rather than the exception throughout the history of the Arab and Muslim world. Any historian of the region would have enough evidence of a tribe or a family whose members fail to act according to the alleged and cherished value system of ‘asabiyya. In fact ‘asabiyya had to be constantly invoked by actors in the absence of real solidarity, manifesting itself through concrete unity or patronage networks. In family situations, polygamy and matrilineal links constantly threaten the expected solidarity emanating from patrilineal blood ties. Given this anthropological footnote, it is doubtful whether the concept of ‘asabiyya can be the foundation for a thesis on politico-economic developments in Saudi Arabia let alone an analytical tool explaining the last half century developments in the field of economy, politics, religion, state and society.

Furthermore, the alleged Najdi solidarity needs to be qualified. From a political economy approach, central Arabia might seem to possess a coherent, dominant, and domineering solidarity vis a vis other regions which are excluded from top political office and economic benefits, for example the Hijaz, Asir, Hasa, and the Northern region. There is no doubt that a claim such as ‘I am Najdi’ is part and parcel of the identity alphabet of some Saudis. However, this claim remains situational, depending on social context where drawing boundaries becomes important. This claim is also not the only one that people who inhabit the geography that is called Najd, invoke to identify themselves.  In addition, the cultural, religious and social traditions of the various regions of Saudi Arabia, with the exception of Najd, are subsumed in official representations of the country. In fact it will not be an exaggeration to say that any politicised expressions of local identities and traditions are forbidden for fear of undermining the state narrative which celebrates homogeneity, territorial unity and social cohesion. However, a bottom up approach reveals that Najd itself is not a coherent entity at the level of geography, social and religious identity, and economic development. Historically local sedentary communities competed and co-operated with nomadic groups. Tribally organised populations coexisted with detribalised sedentary groups. The southern Najdi towns and oases, the home of the Wahhabi movement and Al-Saud were so different from the caravan towns of the centre (Qasim) and the north (Hail).  The Qasimi inhabitants of Unaizah and Buraidah with their outside commercial links were different socially and economically, and one would add religiously from the agricultural peasantry of southern Najd. They shared certain common characteristics but remained autonomous and in possession of a distinct urban identity. These differences within Najd itself make it difficult to talk about the region as if it is a coherent entity capable of producing the kind of solidarity described in this volume. However, this does not undermine the observation that the state and its bureaucracy, together with the economy are dominated by people who happen to come from towns and cities falling within the territory of Najd. More attention should have been given to how the Saudi state has historically identified a number of families from within all regions composing present Saudi Arabia , rather than just Najd, to act as clients for the emerging realm. The Saudi regime operates an extended network of clients that cross cut regional boundaries. People who come from regions other than Najd may not feature in statistics relating to the composition of the Consultative Council, or the Chamber of Commerce but they remain important links between the periphery and the centre of decision making.  In return for loyalty, certain families in the Hijaz, Asir, Hasa, Qasim and the north are personally linked to the ruling group through a web of patronage networks that a political economy approach may not expose. Statistically, it seems that the region of Qasim has recently taken the lead in dominating the state to the extent that the Saudi state of today can easily be described as a Saudi-Qasimi state, with a number of families taking the lion’s share of bureaucratic, military and other jobs. Given the dominance of certain well-known Qasimi families not only in the ranks and file of civil service but also in the army and the economy, observers may conclude that this Qasimi domination could be generalised to mean a Najdi domination. Within Najd itself, there is a clear understanding of the background and social identity of those who control the second ranks in the state.

With the exception of the points raised above, Champion offers a thorough documentation of major political and economic developments in Saudi Arabia over the last fifty years. One of the most illuminating chapter relates to the paradox, the title of the book, namely instability within stability and the urgency of political reform against a background of resistance and delay by the ruling group. The increasing globalisation and the inability of Saudi Arabia to modernise politically, Champion warns, will lead to serious upheaval. Champion is convincing when he concludes that the dysfunctional distributive welfare state cannot be sustained and its survival depends on implementing serious reforms, especially the way nationals think about their economy, society and politics. It remains to be seen how long the Saudi paradox survives without being dismantled. Champion is pessimistic when he argues that the Al- Saud demonstrated legendary inertia in dealing with serious problems of any kind. It seems that recent terrorist attacks, together with the unresolved succession problem, continue to put pressure on the Saudi system. The paradox, however, may prove to be more resilient than imagined for obvious reasons, most importantly overt oppression and the continuous US support despite the rhetoric of criticism after 11 September, not to mention the web of local beneficiaries, brokers, clients, and middlemen whose role is well-documented in this volume.

The book is well researched.  It includes a very long and useful bibliography. The product of a long association with Saudi Arabia and Islam, and a familiarity with the main political actors inside and outside the country, it seems that Paradoxical Kingdom took a long time to complete, which meant that some of the political developments of the 1990s have already been fully interpreted in other publications. Nevertheless, this is a welcome addition.

Professor Madawi Al-Rasheed