Professor Madawi Al Rasheed

Saudi Arabia is an ‘Islamised authoritarianism’. The system rests on propagating religious interpretations of the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet, which seek to anchor authoritarianism in the sacred tradition.

The Islamisation of authoritarian rule is dependent on a number of religious interpretations. These interpretations de-politicise the population, deprive it of the right to have a say in public affairs, require people to offer unlimited obedience to rulers, render a deadly sin any public criticism of people in positions of authority, consider political associations ahzab – a prelude to fitna, discord – insist that the populace are ignorant and prone to blaspheme, condemn society for its moral laxity, defend the alleged piety of the leaders, support and defend policy even when it deviates from mainstream Islamic opinion, and so on.

In order to Islamise authoritarianism, both pragmatism and dogmatism are needed; the first applies only in matters related to society, the second applies in matters related to political decisions. With this deadly combination, Saudis exhibit limited political activism and engagement with public affairs, thus leaving those who hold the strings of power – the wali al-amr – to rule as they see appropriate. Islamised authoritarianism disenfranchises society and renders it weak at the level of organisation. In the absence of legitimate channels of modern associations or civil society, Saudis are cocooned in the familiar and trusted circles of family, tribe, sect, and locality.

Yet today Saudi Arabia is undergoing a series of changes.

The country is in the process of moving from Islamised to liberalised authoritarianism. This change is brought about by two factors. First, violence that started in New York five years ago, and then moved to Saudi cities, created shocks that forced many Saudis – including the leadership – to examine the country’s internal development and domestic policy.

Second, external pressure – mainly US criticism of Saudi domestic social and religious development – focused the Saudi debate on internal social and religious change, while leaving politics outside the debate about reform. Both violence and external pressure pushed the Saudi leadership to respond to a number of voices calling for the introduction of new measures. However, fully aware of the consequences of genuine political reform, the leadership has responded only to calls for economic, religious and social change – thereby leaving politics in the hands of those who had monopolised it.

New-style ‘liberals’

We are now witnessing the consolidation of liberalised authoritarian rule. Examples from the region are abundant. This is not a transition that is leading to serious political reform, which by definition involves separation of powers, independent judiciary, elected national assembly, freedom of expression, greater respect for human rights, religious minorities and women’s rights, and free assembly. Liberalised authoritarianism grows under the umbrella and rhetoric of general reform. It has all the trappings of democracy – but without real democracy.

The impact of liberalised authoritarianism can be more drastic and dangerous than clear-cut absolutism. In the absence of serious political reform, liberalised authoritarianism is a liminal phase- that is it is neither here nor there. It propagates the illusion of freedom which allows people to be more vocal and outspoken, stretching the limits of tolerance and experimenting with propagating new ideas. But at the same time the superficiality of the reform conceals deep rooted authoritarian practices that erupt in response to those who go beyond the threshold.

In liberalised authoritarianism, red lines are not well defined. They are entirely dependent on the whims of the King, the Crown Prince or the Minister of Interior. Because of the rhetoric of reform that dominates the public sphere and is often repeated by high-ranking princes and officials, people think that they can cross red lines but in fact the state is usually very quick in responding to attempts that stretch the limits of its tolerance or threaten aspects of its power.

Turbulent preachers

Reforming religion without reforming the institutions of religion is one characteristic of this new, liberalised authoritarianism. The regime emphasises reforming education and the religious curriculum and adopting the rhetoric of religious pluralism. The regime sacked religious preachers, omitted a few chapters from its religious curriculum, restricted independent charitable work and increased its domination over the religious field.

The regime accepts the accusation that its summer camps and classroom teaching material promote radicalism because this does not point the finger at its own failure – or even its contribution – to promoting this radicalism. The regime does not accept any investigation of its own role in promoting and sponsoring such activities as part of its internal and external policy and quest for legitimacy.

The Saudi regime used and abused religion in its long path to gain legitimacy among a hesitant and conquered internal constituency and an often hostile external audience. Not having fought a national liberation war (like most of the post colonial states of the Middle East), not having mobilised people along national aspirations, the regime could only gain recognition as a result of claiming to have purified Arabia from blasphemous people. This act of purification amounted – at certain historical periods – to a well-documented genocide against people in Hijaz, and in the North, East and South of the country.

The pious and the infidel

By engaging with this limited religious reform – which is applauded by the State Department in Washington – the Saudi regime erodes its own religious legitimacy.

Without a radical religious discourse that is built on a separation between the pious and the infidel, which was propagated by generations of religious scholars, the Al-Saud lose their previous raison d’etre. In the past, this had rested on mythologised claims about being defenders of faith against the alleged blasphemy of others – mainly Western culture and intrusion – in addition of course to Muslims who do not share Saudi religious interpretations.

Limited elections (for example partial elections in the journalist association, chamber of commerce, and municipal elections) are yet another aspect of the liberalised authoritarianism that is taking place. Elections take place without the three most important preconditions for a successful campaign. Saudis still do not enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the presence of an independent judiciary which normally protects these freedoms.

Without these conditions, elections are meaningless and tend to be dominated by people who draw on religious sentiments, tribal identities, and regional belonging. Above all they must have the blessing of political princely and religious authorities. Without the ability to present clear and independent political programmes, candidates and voters tend to mobilise along the primordial axes that must have approval from above.

Who’s talking?

Another aspect of the Liberalisation is the so-called National Dialogue Forum. The regime encourages dialogue under the umbrella of this recently created Forum. The state presents itself as an arbitrator, a mediator between various social groups, whereas in reality it plays a divisive role. Because the state is a resource that people wish to appropriate, influence and control, it is very easy for this state to play a divisive role. The state is booty to be appropriated by various groups.

Today the country is witnessing the proliferation of quasi-independent civil society associations – and the more human right organisations the better. But while it is acceptable for a human rights organisation to adopt the case of a famous female TV presenter who suffered domestic violence, the same organisation remains silent over the torture of political prisoners in Saudi prisons.

In the absence of political parties, these quasi-independent organisations eventually get politicised, thus losing their independence and ability to act on humanitarian grounds. The more they become entangled with political issues, the more they are divided and discredited. Humanitarian NGOs become a front for political activism. Activists with a clear political agenda tend to use them as a vehicle for their own purposes. Similarly, independent charitable foundations become increasingly politicised. They can channel funds towards political rather than humanitarian causes.

Two faces

The new liberalised authoritarianism is based on two distinct discourses, one for external consumption – with several princes playing a leading role, for example Saud al-Faysal and Turki al-Faysal – and another one for local consumption.

In an interview with the German newspaper Der Spiegel, Prince Saud al-Faysal argued that Islam does not prohibit women from driving cars. He asserted that he will not object to his daughters driving. By contrast, in an interview with a local newspaper, Minister of Interior Prince Nayef was asked about the prospect of women driving in Saudi Arabia. He asserted that Saudi women are “pious and respectable”, unlike other women in the West who live off selling their honour – thereby confirming the saying that all politics is local.

The prince was addressing his local constituency. Groups of princes are designated to talk to the outside world and another group designated to talk to the internal constituency. In an age of new communication technology, the contradictory Saudi political discourse diminishes the credibility of the leadership.

A feature of the new liberalisation is the promotion of less social conservatism. Issues related to the role of women appeal to a liberal constituency at home and Western governments abroad. The state presents itself as the leading partner in the emancipation of Saudi women, thus encouraging a kind of state feminism, reminiscent of the 1960s rhetoric of the revolutionary Arab regimes.

This discourse serves to legitimate the existing order rather than improve the legal, economic, and social status of women. Some women see the regime – especially the King – as the saviour, who will protect them against the fanaticism of their co-religionists.

Unfortunately women will be used and abused as they are portrayed as symbols for either the piety of the nation or its modernity. Some of the quasi-gains that women will acquire during this phase are easily reversed. In the future we will see greater women’s employment in prestigious and visible positions, but reforming the judiciary in its dealing with women’s issues will remain a distant objective. So far the Saudi leadership has encouraged female employment in lingerie shops – which must now sack their male vendors – thus appealing to those calling for such a measure and fighting unemployment among women.

Loyal opposition

Liberalising authoritarianism also requires allowing a loyal opposition to operate, though as an opposition that will eventually be turned into a force that defends the realm. Today, it is obvious that the Islamist and liberal camps have turned into a loyal opposition.

The concept of opposition involves groups striving towards seizing power at the expense of other groups. Within Saudi Arabia this is not possible. In the Saudi case, opposition means a war between various social and political groups rather than between these groups and the government. Today an acquiescent Islamist opposition is given the green light to vent its anger towards the West. Meanwhile, Islamists, liberals and others are allowed to voice criticism against US policies, but they are prevented from even mentioning the friendly relations between the Saudi regime and the US.

The Danish caricature of the Prophet Muhammad, and Saudi Islamist reactions, proves that the opposition must be selective when it encourages public displays of anger and frustration. Similarly, Pope Benedict’s statement about Islam was received with outrage from the local constituency – but none had so far asked their government to act.

It is permissible to voice anger against a small almost politically marginal European country like Denmark or the Vatican, but it is taboo to call for boycotting the United States over the defilement of the Quran in the toilets of Guantanamo Bay. Had Islamist loyalists been given some freedom to criticise their own government they would have possibly been less vocal in denouncing Denmark, the US or other Western countries they define as the enemy. Islamists sublimate their grievances against their own government by adopting anti-Western politics.

Recognising the Other

Liberalised authoritarianism requires recognition of religious diversity within the country, for example Shiites, Sufis, Zaydis and Ismailis. This recognition falls short of recognising the specific schools of jurisprudence of other Muslims and their representation in the Council of Higher Ulama, the highest religious authority or the judiciary. Jafari fiqh remains unrepresented in the recognised High Religious Council at the national level, although Shiites resort to their own scholars socially and in matters related to personal worship and rules.

The regime hopes that these steps can pacify the population and eradicate terror. More importantly, these steps aim to calm external Western voices asking for change – not because they are sympathetic to internal Saudi causes, but because they believe that their own security is better served if Saudi Arabia promotes the trappings of democracy without real democratisation.

The US moved from the rhetoric of establishing democracy in the region to ‘democratisation’, implying a slow process for change that opens the system but does not open it enough to allow undesirable undemocratic figures in. On several occasions, American officials including George Bush, Condoleezza Rice and Caren Hughes, have expressed satisfaction regarding the “democratic” measures introduced by the Saudi government. Recently, the regime was congratulated by Washington for its compliance with the agenda of changing its religious curriculum.

The Saudi regime seems to be more than eager to improvise. The question this quasi-liberalisation poses is whether such timid measures provide the kind of security desired by the West. We cannot rule out that many in Saudi Arabia see a liberal social policy and interference with religious interpretations as a direct response to outside pressure. Liberalisation may backfire in situations where it goes too far, especially in social and religious matters. These limited changes may prove to be counter-productive while serious political reform is on hold.