In contrast, the current state of 1932 evokes only negative responses among Saudi Jihadi Salafis.  Today Saudi Jihadis contest its legitimacy, name, law, borders and foreign policies. Many Saudi Jihadis regard it as an aberration of the first experience. Its creation is attributed to an illegitimate relationship with an infidel power (Britain). Its name is denounced as a family fiefdom; its nationality is rejected as a modern innovation that is not anchored in Islamic text or historical practice; its foreign relations, especially its alliance with the West, violate the tenth principle of iman, faith, in Wahhabi theology, namely al-wala wa al-bara, association with Muslims and dissociation from infidels. Against the global Jihadi message, the local state remains a rejected aberration.

The differences between the first state and the contemporary one are treated by Faris al-Shuwayl (detained in Saudi Arabia since 2004), known as Sheikh Abu Jandal al-Azdi who replies to a query, posted to him on the internet. He is asked his opinion regarding the differences between the first and contemporary states. His reply outlines how a Muslim should proceed in his evaluation of the first state. He glorifies the first state and argues that in each family there are those who are good and those who are bad. One must distinguish between the good and the debauched from among the Al-Saud family. The first state was one that corresponds most to the ideal Islamic polity. He lists its assets:   making religion triumphant, fighting blasphemy, applying sharia, and purifying Islam from Sufis, philosophers,  and innovators.  Its unity is not derived from the cultural or ethnic characteristics of people, common economic interest,  or geographical boundaries,  but  from belief in one God. The first state embodied a borderless Salafiyya uncontaminated by practices of the contemporary nation-state. Rather than spreading the flames of Jihad, the contemporary state prohibited it under foreign pressure. Furthermore, it opened its territories to foreign troops and allowed military basis to be established in the land of Islam. In addition, it allowed istitan, the settlements of foreigners who brought their ways of life to sacred space, which should remain pure and uncontaminated by the kafr ways of Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists.


Local and global identities

Jihadis who reject the contemporary state accept only two identities, one extremely narrow defined in either regional or tribal affiliation, and one extremely global defined in a deterritorialised utopia, the Muslim umma. Jihadi ideologue Faris ibn Shuwayl clearly articulates this position. In a famous letter entitled Saudi Nationality Under my Foot, he introduces himself as Faris ibn Ahmad ibn Juman ibn Ali al-Shuwayl al-Hasani al-Zahrani al-Azadi, thus anchoring his identity in Zahran, one of the Hijazi Qahtani tribes of contemporary Saudi Arabia. He asserts that he does not recognise Saudi nationality:

“I am a Muslim among Muslims. I read history and did not find something called jinsiyya (nationality). Each Muslim must operate in dar al-Islam wherever he wants and without borders restraining him or passports confining him and without a taghut watan (despot nation)  to worship. My fathers are known, my family is known, my tribe Zahran belong to the Azd. Therefore I do not belong to Al-Saud who have no right to make people belong to them.”iii

Faris ibn Shuwayl calls upon the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to remember that the return of their glory will be dependent on returning to Islam and  rejecting  a government that revealed kufr bawah, obvious blasphemy, governed by rules other than those of God, opened the land for Jews and Crusaders, and killed pious Muslims, arrested people of knowledge, and stole public wealth. He calls upon the ‘lions of the Peninsula’, the grandsons of muhajirun, early Muslim converts who migrated with the Prophet to Madina,  and ansar, the Madinians who supported them, to dissociate themselves from the  contemporary state.  

Tribal affiliation becomes the first important marker of a narrow identity that defines the individual and anchors him in an old hierarchy of noble tribes, whose prestige and standing stem from their early support for the message of the prophet. While this identity is constructed on the basis of kinship and blood ties, the tribe acquires local significance in the war on blasphemy and the purification of the land from polytheism. It is incumbent on this narrow tribal construction to make Islam dominant and hegemonic. The narrow local identification should be put at the service of the global message.

From the narrow confines of local tribal identity, al-Shuwayl moves to the global Muslim ideal, where brotherhood is established as a result of tawhid, in its spiritual rather than geographical meaning.  In this typology of identities that move from the very local to the global, there is no space for modern constructions such as jinsiyya (nationality) and wataniyya (citizenship).  Al-Shuwayl invites Muslims to reject these modern constructions, considered as instruments of division between Muslims, whose unity cannot be established on common economic interest or any other interest except belief in one God.  Nationality and citizenship cannot mediate between the very local and the very global, as had become the norm and practice in the world. There is only one path that can mediate between the local and the global. This is the space of jazirat al-Arab or bilad al-haramayn, an identity that derives its legitimacy from Arab heritage and sacred space, the two holy mosques. The Arabian Peninsula becomes the regional mediator between the tribe on the one hand and the umma on the other hand. This model should be the only possible and legitimate one.  Arab identity, where it first emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, becomes a source of pride.


Tension between the local and the global

Lewis Atiyat Allah advocates global Jihad, who has a prominent presence on jihadi websites. His vision encompasses an Islamic world order that opposes and defies the current international world order, under US hegemony.iv His Jihad is very much dependent on the notion of an Islamic umma, encompassing different races, nationalities and cultural groups. The unity of this umma is derived from faith rather than race. However, Lewis turns his attention to his homeland, the most sacred territory and the core of the Muslim world, the Land of the Two Holy Mosques. His homeland is central in the establishment of the Islamic world order, but unfortunately, according to Lewis, it has become, under the current Saudi leadership, a vehicle for Western hegemony. Lewis seems to blur the boundaries between the so-called national and the transnational Islamists, a dichotomy that has become fashionable in several academic studies of the Islamist movement after 9/11.

When Lewis ‘returns’ to bilad al-haramayn, he is transformed into a nationalist who invokes notions of sacred territory, historical responsibility and the glorious past. For Lewis bilad al-haramayn is not only Mecca and Madina, theoretically closed to non-Muslims, but the whole Arabian Peninsula. As such, the land of Islam needs to be freed from acts of defilement, manifested in the actual physical presence of non-Muslims.  This foreign presence encompasses not only US soldiers and military bases, but also non-Muslim workers, especially Western expatriates. According to Lewis, foreigners, obviously regarded as profane, violate the purity of this geographical entity. Here the boundaries of bilad al-haramayn are seen as having become porous, allowing in the process a greater defilement and molestation to take place not only on the periphery but also in the core of this sacred territory.  

He calls upon the ‘grandsons of the companions of the Prophet to expel the infidels from jazirat al-arab’, following the prophetic tradition. Jazirat al-arab is another central term for Lewis. It invokes ‘Arab’ possession of a territory, which the descriptive nomenclature al-jazira al-arabiyya fails to capture. Furthermore, jazirat al-arab conveys a different meaning from that implied by bilad al-haramyn. The first invokes the centrality of the Arab dimension of the Jihad option and the historical responsibility of the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula to take the lead in the struggle. When Lewis invokes jazirat al-arab, there is no doubt that he is an Arab nationalist, thus exposing the tension between the universal Muslim community, the umma, and the particular, his own homeland. He resolves this tension by ascribing a central role to his own native land, fusing the local – his homeland – in the global project, the envisaged Islamic world order.

The centrality of the local in the global Jihadi project manifests itself in the desire to cleanse the Arabian Peninsula and Arabs from the sin of not only actively contributing  to the destruction of the Islamic caliphate in the first World War but also becoming the vanguards of this destruction. While the Ottoman Caliphate is not held to be the desired Islamic Caliphate especially in its later years, Jihadis lament its downfall and the Arab contribution to its demise. The participation of Saudis in Jihadi projects on the periphery of the Muslim umma (for example in Afghanistan and Iraq) is an act of both purification and  reclamation of a lost glory.

Saudi Jihadi discourse and practices create unresolved contradictions. In Saudi Arabia, dissident Jihadis recognise only two identities, one originating in tribal affiliation and one in a global Muslim construction with the Arabian Peninsula mediating between these two distant poles. Other mediating constructions such as nationality are rejected as forms of innovation and blasphemy whose main purpose is to divide and undermine Muslim unity. However, when action is concerned, for example pursuing Jihad, there is an on-going debate that does not seem to be resolved in the near future. Some Saudi Jihadis will  remain at home to correct the aberration and topple the contemporary Saudi state while others will choose to pursue Jihad abroad as an act of purification of Arab sins.  From afar, they will aspire to make Islam once again dominant and hegemonic.  In pursuing this project, Saudis are called upon to play a leading role. Their local identity is paramount in the global project, yet the local remains problematic, or at least in need of justification.   







i This short paper draws on Madawi Al-Rasheed Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. It appeared in ISIM Review 21, Spring 2008.

ii Although Saudi involvement in Jihadi projects abroad was initially state sponsored, for example in Afghanistan, it later escaped the control of its sponsors. For more details, see Al-Rasheed 2007.

iii Faris Al-Shuwayl, http://www.islah.tv

iv For a full biography, see Al-Rasheed 2007.

------------------------------------------------------------

The House of Saud has had a solid shield against the winds of change. It was not the backward, ignorant and fragmented masses, the constant military support of Western governments, nor the pietist-quietist religious scholars, who kept the House’s firm grip on power.

It is a redistributive system, whereby patronage and clientlism operated among a coterie of princes. Big princes, very much like the famous Big Men of New Guinea, described by French anthropologist Godelier, amass wealth and social capital to be redistributed among princes of a lesser God, thus creating in the process circles of loyalty within a state that is today a headless tribe. The House of Saud remained immune against internal dissent because it patronised its own family members, divided wealth among senior princes, who in turn formed circles of clients among less prominent ones. The county and its wealth are vast, allowing aspiring princes to preside over mini-fiefdoms within the state.

The state has become like a traditional African polity, for example the type that Britain struggled to pacify among the headless Nuer tribe of the Sudan in the early 1940s. Within the polity various segments co-existed, co-operated and competed, while keeping the polity working as a result of a precarious balance and equilibrium. Even without a head, the headless tribe resisted British penetration of its land and staged several solidarity and resistance contests. At the end the tribe was pacified and conquered and British rule prevailed.

For the balance and equilibrium to work, the segments need to be equal. But Alas, we live in a world where inequality, even between princes is the norm. Therefore, institutionalising the semblance of equality in an archaic but resilient absolute monarchy serves many purposes. In addition to the media fascination with matters Saudi and the unique Saudi version of democracy, the Allegiance Committee is meant to insert elements of routinisation, bureaucratisation and rationalisation in power, Weberian Style. As traditional authority lost its Charisma under international pressure and internal dissent, the House is now seeking the last solution, hoping to salvage its grip on power.

The Allegiance Committee is a secret association, a cult of elders, activated only after King Abdullah and his Crown Prince Sultan pass away. The Committee consistes of thirty five princes and is headed by Mishal ibn Abd al-Aziz. Three very ill descendants of the founder of Saudi Arabia are absent, Bandar, Musaid and Nawaf. Their eldest sons represent them. Dead ancestors, for example deceased kings and other collateral members of the group, are also represented by their eldest sons. Khalid al-Faisal represent deceased King Faisal. Current King and Crown prince are represented by their sons too.

The only non-royalty is the clerk, the keeper of secrets, a member of the al-Tuwaijiri family, a loyal group from al-Majma’a who produced several technocrats and bureaucrats currently supporting the King as advisors, consultant and National Guard personnel. They are part of the circle of clients beyond the royal circle.

The allegiance Committee invokes the Quran and Sunnah and stipulates that shura (consultation) is the foundation of this secret committee. Appealing to shura here is rather limited and unconvincing. Although shura was not practised historically in any era of Islamic history after the four Caliphs- even then there is a debate about whether it was practised- the House of Saud tries hard to convince its subjects that it upholds this Islamic tradition. More importantly, the House raises the flag of shura against outside criticism of its political system and misguided calls for democracy. How could the West, ignorant of the authentic Islamic tradition, calls upon Saudis, if ever it does, to endorse an alien concept such as democracy in a country faithful to its Islamic tradition? The secret committee is shura Saudi style, above and beyond alien Greek concepts and their hazards.

The House of Saud adds a secret committee to its very long list of secret affairs. No appointed or elected shura council, no Grand Mufti, no ahl al-hal wa al-aqd (those who loose and tie- meaning those who know), nobody else is part of a decision that has always been an al-Saud prerogative. It is interesting that the House has gone beyond paying lip service to its long lasting loyalist al-Sheikh Muftis and ulama and excluded them all together from being spectators of the baya, (oath of allegiance), as they have always been. In the new committee they are simply not there to oversee and observe. Yet when time comes they will be called upon to approve, together with notables, commoners and clients.

The committee does not guarantee a smooth transition to the second generation. Unfortunate for the House, the facts of demography seem to be triumphant here, thanks to polygamous and serial marriages over the years. Among the second generation committee member princes, there is a large number of warrior princes, heritage princes, security guards, foreign affairs specialists, media tycoons, and so on. As the senior ones have shared the polity through their fiefdoms, the second generation is already in place to inherit the fathers. The future head of the circle will always remain difficult to choose. The balance an equilibrium will have to be respected in future elections.

What has triumphed so far is the prospect of an elected king in a royal headless gerontocracy.

It was only after the first oil boom of the 1970s that the Saudi government turned its attention to systematically producing the great historical narrative that most Arab regimes had already produced and propagated to consolidate the nascent nation states that emerged in the post World War II era. Unlike in other Arab countries, and with the exception of one or two Saudi historians, modern Saudi historical research centres relied on Arab scholars, who were either seconded from their own academic institutions or had settled in the country. Even then, and because of serious human resource shortage, Saudi school and university history text books, and even the religious curriculum, were often written by Arabs, mainly Levantine and Egyptians who were entrusted with the task of narrating Saudi Arabia.

The narration was meant to establish and enforce two important state legitimacy narratives, one reflected the need to legitimate the state internally, the other reflected the need to legitimate the state externally in the Arab and Islamic contexts.

The establishment of King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives in Riyadh (known as al-Dara) in1972 marked the beginning of institutionalised official historiography, after a long period of laisser-faire approach to narrating the past. The role of this research centre in shaping historical imagination became paramount. In the 1980s  an ambitious government scheme materialised in  sending at least thirty Saudi students to various American universities to write PhD dissertations on Al-Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, thus establishing modern Saudi historiography. The role of such students and that of al-Dara reached a climax with the 1999 centennial celebrations that coincided with the publication of hundreds of history books, foreign memoirs, translation of foreign testimonies, and official letters and sermons by King Abdulaziz ibn Saud (1876-1953) hereafter Ibn Saud, all marking ‘one hundred year of development, prosperity and political wisdom’.i The publication of selected documents and letters from various archival sources marked the beginning of documenting Saudi history from an official point of view.ii 

To establish the internal legitimacy of the 1932 state, history was constructed as a project of tawhid, thus continuing the tradition of the theological history that dominated early religious scholars’ approaches to the past. In Arabic tawhid is both monotheism and unification, in the political and geographical sense. According to state narratives, the project of purifying Arabia from kufr, blasphemy and bida, innovation, under the banner of Jihad against a blasphemous population resulted in the political unification of the country, thanks to the efforts of Ibn Saud.

Those who narrated Saudi Arabia, initially Arabs and later Saudis were equally concerned with legitimating the state externally among Arabs and Muslims who were suspicious of Saudi control over the holiest of all places, Mecca. Now in control of the two holiest Islamic sites,  Ibn Saud, was constructed as the pious Muslim-Arab leader who aspired to defend the sanctity of the third Islamic sanctuary, al-Quds al-Sharif.

The Quest For legitimacy abroad

It seems that in the 1930s and early 1940s, Ibn Saud appeared to be isolated both ideologically and politically in the wider context of the Arab world. His state religion Wahhabiyya was projected by outsiders as a fanatical sect that promises to threaten stability in neighbouring countries, especially Iraq, Transjordan and Gulf states where British influence was paramount. The suppressed Ikhwan rebellion of 1927 did much to undermine the credibility of the Saudi realm not only in the eyes of neighbouring Arabs but also British officials. In a revealing Memorandum, Sir Andrew Ryan wrote in July 1932

‘There are [now] fewer internal signs of discontent with the Saudi regime than there were in 1931. It cannot be called popular, but some at least of the tribes are too broken to think of resistance, the townsmen seem more resigned, and some of them have an increasing interests in the stability of the present regime’.iii

The successful suppression of internal tribal dissent within the Saudi realm failed to break the isolation of the Saudi leadership, now in control of the two holiest shrines in Islam. Sir Ryan pointed out that by 1932 this isolation was less pronounced than it was as Ibn Saud ‘has learned to control his hatred, if not his suspicion, of the Hashemites. Carefully nurtured sympathy with him seems to abound in Palestine and Syria’.iv

It is in this specific context that Palestine and the upheaval of 1948 became part and parcel of narrating Saudi Arabia.  This chapter explores the official Saudi narrative that highlights contribution to ‘defending’ Palestine, then it considers the dissenting voices who challenged the authenticity and the credibility of this official narrative. Finally, by navigating a thin line that separates the official from the unofficial, the chapter aims to present an interpretation and assessment of Saudi involvement and role in the 1948 Palestine War that goes beyond the official discourse of glorification and the counter narratives of condemnation and treason. 

History from above: narrating the war in Palestine

It is too simplistic to claim that the Arab intelligentsia that narrated the Palestinian crisis of 1948 (for Saudis and other Arabs) from the point of view of official Saudi Arabia was co-opted and rewarded for such an ideological project, so important to legitimate the Saudi state in the wider Arab-Islamic context. Narrators were not simply acting ‘on-behalf’ of the Saudi project. In writing Saudi involvement in Palestine, they were autonomous agencies, whose narrative must be seen in the context of the Arab mid century divide between the Hashemite (in Tansjordan and Iraq) on one side and the Al-Saud (with Egypt and Syria) on the other. It is therefore no surprise that Syrians and Egyptians were active participants in the narration of the story on behalf of Saudis who still had a long way to go before they were able to establish their own narratives about supporting the Palestinian cause.  It is also no surprise that those who challenged the official Saudi narrative were initially pro-Hashemites and later revolutionary Palestinians and Egyptians.

In Saudi narratives, the role of Saudi Arabia in general and Ibn Saud in particular is paramount. Ibn Saud is projected as an Arab and Muslim leader who resisted the creation of the Zionist state, complained about Jewish migration and objected to the partition of Palestine.  In less than half a page, secondary school Saudi history textbook reiterates that

‘The Palestinian cause is the primary cause of Arabs and Muslims. Britain allowed the Zionists to establish a strong hold in Palestine. Consequently Palestinians defended their rights and they were supported by other Arabs, the first amongst them was King Abdulaziz, who gave them moral and material support.  He used all his efforts to convince the British and US leaderships to do justice for Palestinians. He defended them in the United Nations. When Britain withdrew from Palestine in 1948, Arab armies moved to Palestine, amongst them was units from the Saudi army’.v

As expected, the official historical narrative remains silent on the intimate relationship of ‘friendship’ nurtured by Ibn Saud with Britain during the 1930s and 1940 and how this relationship prevented Ibn Saud from taking more active position in dealing with the Palestinian crisis. The official historical narrative overlooks the underdeveloped Saudi military capabilities in 1947-1948, which must be considered in any evaluation of Saudi involvement in the war. Also the official narrative remains silent on the rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites, whose demise in the Hijaz did not end the enmity and mistrust between the House of Saud and the House of Hashem. In fact this enmity, more than any other factor, shaped the way the Saudi leadership dealt with not only the Palestinian crisis but also  the monarchs of Iraq and Transjordan.

It is important to examine selected speeches, letters, telegrams and memorandum that were all initiated by the Saudi leadership and presented and published by official Saudi research centres. Such publications reflect the Saudi leadership’s quest to establish its legitimacy as a state and leadership in a wider Arab and Muslim context. When complimented by foreign archives, mainly British sources, and other non-official Saudi and Arab narratives, I hope to shed light on the Saudi involvement in the 1948 Palestine War.

Ibn Saud on Palestine: the quest for legitimacy1932-1939

Min khutab al-malik Abdulaziz is a selection of speeches by the king delivered over several decades.vi The Palestinian question is dealt with in the last section of this collection in which more than 10 speeches by King Ibn Saud on Palestine are included. One set of speeches addresses Palestinians, for example the head of al-Majlis al-Islami al-Ala in Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Huseini; a second set of speeches addresses the British government and responds to its demands and occasional accusations, and a third set of letters addresses American presidents Roosevelt and Truman.  The speeches are meant to document the serious efforts of the King on three fronts. The speeches sum up the official Saudi position on the Palestinian crisis. Needless to emphasise  that the speeches are selected from a wider correspondence  that we can  access only in foreign archives. What is made available to the general Arab public through such Saudi publications is obviously a selection of letters that reflect the so-called concern of the king with Arab and Muslim causes. The King’s  letters to Britain and  his determination to use all his efforts in order to maintain his friendship with Britain, even at the expense of the Palestinian cause, remain absent in official Saudi publications.

One of the first correspondence between Ibn Saud and Haj Amin al-Huseini does not reflect great enthusiasm on behalf of the former in support of the Palestinian cause. Ibn Saud apologises to al-Huseini for not sending a representative to the meeting held in Jerusalem on 27 Rajab 1350H. Ibn Saud claims that the letter to participate in this meeting arrived late in Riyadh. He, however, is ‘aware of the difficulties faced by the people in Palestine and  wishes them success and progress… I am sure you know my good intentions and how I always follow your news. We advise you now so that those mughridin do not give the enemies an opportunity to win and succeed’.vii The reference to mughridin is extremely interesting. Ibn Saud was sending a warning to al-Huseini regarding the ‘intentions’ of other Arabs, an implicit reference to Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. This was an early warning signal that would set the scene for later Saudi involvement in the Palestinian problem. The Saudi position was from the very beginning determined by the enmity between the house of the Hashem and the house of Saud, an enmity that left its marks not only on diplomatic correspondence with Britain but also on the course of military strategy that was taken by Saudi Arabia, its alliance with King Faruk of Egypt and Shukri Quwatli of Syria.

As the situation in Palestine deteriorated in 1936,viii Ibn Saud sent several letters to the British Foreign Office through the Jeddah consulate. On 7 May 1936 the British government issued an early warning to Ibn Saud, ‘the Arab agitation in Palestine is directed against the policy of his Majesty’s Government, and for Ibn Saud to declare his sympathy to it would be to declare himself on the side of those hostile to British policy in a country under British administration. This would be incompatible with his professions of friendly sentiments…His Majesty’s Government are…entitled to expect him to refrain from encouraging those who are making difficulties for them’.ix

In all Ibn Saud’s correspondence, several issues were always raised. First, concern over not emphasising enough his loyalty to Britain, regarded as a friend of the Arabs. Early in the 1930s, it was reported that ‘Ibn Saud sought a rapproachment with His Majesty’s Government. He was obsessed by suspicion of the Hashemite rulers and one of his objects was the impossible one of ousting them from the position of special favour accorded to them by his Majesty’s Government…However, Ibn Saud still sees in his majesty’s Government the most important foreign factor in the world about him and again he seeks a rapproachment in a spirit of anxious misgiving’.x  While the British authorities were aware of the correspondence of Haj Amin al-Huseini with Ibn Saud, they were regularly assured that no action will be taken. Yusif Yasin, an Arab functionary in charge of Ibn Saud’s foreign affairs told the British authorities

‘Yusif Yasin spoke of king’s desire not to do anything which would clash with the policy of His Majesty’s Government but he also spoke of the importance to the king of maintaining his prestige in the Arab world. He referred to the ‘general Arab feeling’…of which account must be taken’.xi

The British government was assured  that Ibn Saud would not engage in any policy that contradicts the professed  statements of loyalty but  it was made clear to Yusif Yasin that the king should not encourage hopes that he might [underlined in the original] interfere eventually. Yusif Yasin suggested that Ibn Saud’s reply to Amin al-Huseini might take the form of general expression of good wishes.xii

In 1937, Ibn Saud wrote to Britain ‘we do not need to assure the British government that it remains our friend…our traditional policy that we have followed allows us to exchange opinions with Britain. We Arabs seek peace with Britain. Those who have not followed this rule are the Arabs of Palestine [a reference to the riots of 1936].xiii  In order to prove how this friendship is cherished Ibn Saud promised Britain that he will ‘advise the people of Palestine to remain peaceful and engage in discussion with Britain’.xiv 

In 1938 he repeated his pledges to remain loyal to Britain and dismissed ‘rumours’, that Britain received allegedly  from Syria and Iraq. British officials in Jeddah confronted Ibn Saud with news that people in the northern town of al-Jauf had gathered and smuggled weapons to the rebels in Palestine. Ibn Saud dismissed these rumours,   ‘the claim that from our sand, military equipment was sent to the rebels in Palestine…these are rumours whose purpose is to spoil our friendship. However, I am a liar if I say to you that there is a bit in my body that does not want me to fight the Jews but Britain is the ultimate judge in Palestine and it is in the interests of the Arabs to remain loyal to Britain. We must confess that we received many requests to help with the revolution in Palestine  but God willing we will never do anything that undermines our promises to Britain…Even if all Arabs unite they will never be able to defeat Britain. If this is the case, how could we provide the rebels with military assistance which will never change this reality?’xv Ibn Saud dismissed allegations that he assisted Palestinian rebels on the ground that these were rumours propagated by people who were sahib hawa (have opinion) or had gharadh (hidden agenda). He also drew attention to the possibility of Palestinians propagating such rumours to boost the morale and revolutionary sentiments of their own people. He mentioned that he was also accused by Arabs that his silence so far was interpreted as an endorsement of the British plan to partition Palestine. He reminded Britain that he refrained from giving explicit support against a background whereby ‘my own people [Saudis] are affected by the Palestinian crisis. Because they fear me, they had restrained themselves from further agitations’. Again, Ibn Saud assures Britain that he remains loyal to the taahudat given to Britain and he will continue to provide advise and exchange opinions’.xvi It was reported that,

‘Ibn Saud had recently received various reports that the Bedouins, both in Saudi Arabia and in Tansjordan were threatening to take action and to make demonstrations ….His Majesty has already deprecated such action and had issued order to his local governors that any demonstrations …should be suppressed …arrest might be inevitable of some of his own subjects’.xvii

This position, developed and repeated throughout Ibn Saud’s correspondence with Britain in the 1930s, continued in the 1940s. While Ibn Saud expressed his sympathy with the Palestinian cause, he was not prepared to jeopardise his friendship with Britain.

The second theme that dominates the Saudi position over Palestine was concern over Jewish immigration. This was expressed in several letters to British officials and in meetings between British officials on the one hand and Yusif Yasin and Fuad Hamza. both were part of the team of Arab functionaries who dealt with the King’s foreign affairs and British officials in Jeddah and London. Ibn Saud repeatedly expressed his concern over his stature among Arabs if he remained silent over the issue of Jewish migration. He wrote to the British government in 1937 highlighting how his prestige among not only his own subjects but also among other Arabs will be affected if he did not raise objections to the increased Jewish migration. He repeated that ‘the number of Jews in Palestine has increased. This is worrying not only Palestinians but other Muslims. We suggest that the British Government halts Jewish migration for at least ten years to dispel unrest, worry and violence.xviii The issue of migration was also linked to the sale of Arab land to Jews. He suggested to the British government to regulate land sale in order to protect the small and modest plots of the impoverished Palestinians.  

The third theme in Ibn Saud’s letters on Palestine reflected his concern over the shape and structure of any Palestinian government after the end of the British mandate. Ibn Saud could not envisage a Hashemite take over of Jerusalem after the departure of Britain. Therefore, he rejected any plans to partition Palestine and suggested to Britain to establish hukuma distoriyya, constitutional government that included only ‘the current residents of Palestine with special provisions that ensure the protection of the Holy sites and their accessibility to all, with special protection to minorities and British interests’.xix  His insistence on priority being given to the residents of Palestine was a clear reflection of his suspicion of Hashemite plans that might include the incorporation of Jerusalem in  the Jordanian realm. The Saudi leadership dismissed any British suggestion that one Arab leadership should play a leading role in discussing the Palestinian crisis. Ibn Saud always insisted that he had no objections to ‘bringing Amir Abdullah but it was desirable that Egypt would not be brought into collective action in Palestine and Arab affairs’.xx While Ibn Saud was concerned over the future of Palestine after the end of the mandate, his fears extended to Tansjordan.

British Political Resident in Bahrain wrote to the Foreign Office that ‘Ibn Saud considers his interests to be affected very unfavourably by the prospective renunciation of British mandate over Transjordan so long as the mandate lasted he says, he knew that Abdullah’s intrigues would be held in check, that Saudi claim to Aqaba and Maan would not lapse…If Abdullah is to be independent, Ibn Saud wants two towns and a corridor (not a mere right of way) to Syria’.xxi

It is not an overstatement to conclude that in the late 1930s Ibn Saud preferred the British mandate to remain in place not only  in Palestine but also in Tansjordan. He threatened to revive territorial claims over Aqaba and Maan in order to secure his position and gain a foot in Amir Abduallah’s realm. George Rendel, who had several interviews with Ibn Saud summed up the King’s position,

‘As a Moslem and an Arab his sympathy naturally lay with the Arabs of Palestine. He has suppressed these feelings out of friendship for his Majesty’s Government and he could  always suppress his feelings in the interests of policy…but he stood alone, and he had to think of his position in a world where many of his co-religionists would not even admit that he was a Moslem’.xxii

It is this constant quest for legitimacy among Arabs and Muslims that shaped Saudi involvement in Palestine. The fact that ‘many co-relgionists would not admit that Ibn Saud was a Muslim’ attests to a precarious position at a time when Ibn Saud wanted to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims worldwide to secure his recent occupation of the Hijaz. Ibn Saud was desperate for this legitimacy,  which he could not take for granted. His correspondence with Britain reflected great understanding of the British position and dilemma’s which he was determined to help alleviate to maintain his friendship with a power that he saw as a check on the ambitions of the two Hashemite realms and their own legitimacy in the Arab world. Britain was also the colonial power in several countries that had huge Muslim population eager to perform the pilgrimage in his recently acquired territories. Pledging loyalty to Britain and continuously insisting on the benefit of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian problem reflected his concern over his borders with both Iraq and Transjordan, in his opinion protected only because of British mandate over these territories. He preferred the perpetuation of this mandate to the emergence of two independent Hashemite kingdoms to the north of his realm.

Ibn Saud invoked the reaction of his ‘people’ to British policy makers and presented himself in his correspondence as the king who faces societal pressure from groups inside the country who oppose Jewish migration and the partition of Palestine. On several occasions, Ibn Saud raised the issue of his prestige among his own people and among Muslims. He also continued to refer to ‘pressures’ from his own people to engage with the Palestinian crisis by helping Palestinians secure a home. However, in British Foreign Office documents, it is clear that not many British officials worried about for example the ulama of Najd and Hijaz and the tribal population and its opinion on Palestine. British assessment of the so-called internal pressures on Ibn Saud dismissed them as irrelevant factors in Ibn Saud’s policy towards the question of Palestine.  From Jeddah  George Rendel responded to a Foreign Office statement about the alleged pressures Ibn Saud was experiencing as a result of the attitude adopted by the ulama of Najd and Muslim opinion on Palestine.  Rendel dismisses London’s anxiety and confirms that

‘..the degree of the influence which the ulama whether in Nejd or of the Hejaz, are able to exercise on Ibn Saud, or of the extent to which the reactions of Moslem opinion to the proposals for the partition of Palestine have hitherto found  expression, in spontaneous manifestation of public opinion or in articles in the press, do not provide the only or most reliable standards on which the present situation should be judged….in an autocratic country the people will not usually demonstrate, however strong their feeling without knowing beforehand that they will not suffer for it…The Hejaz is too busy with the pilgrimage to devote much attention to Palestine… Ibn Saud  has always been careful to keep on good  terms with his own ulama.. This does not mean that he is unduly under their influence, and in an internal matter, he could doubtless make hold their tongues.[for] Ibn Saud to describe his situation as desperate because of local religious criticism is an exaggeration; but it is reasonable to believe that the ulama of Nejd…. detest Zionist policy, and that Ibn Saud, who must know how little support he enjoys in the Hejaz, feels compelled to take their views into consideration’. xxiii

It is important to note that the ‘people’ of Saudi Arabia, in all their categories, for example Hijazi elite and merchants, Najdi tribal population and  ulama, often mentioned in this correspondence, were not in a position to formulate clear opinion on Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s for a simple reason. Absence of information was a main factor. Saudi Arabia had only one official newspaper, Umm al-Qura, published in Mecca. The newspaper must have had a limited circulation given the high rates of illiteracy at the time. Furthermore, access to Saudi Arabia was restricted to those authorised by Britain; the biggest flux of visitors would have normally come during the pilgrimage season, which in the early 1930s was severely affected by the world economic recession.  An Iraqi radio station was based in Baghdad but it  was doubtful that its news and reporting  reached a wide audience in Saudi Arabia. An Italian radio station broadcasting in Arabic started in 1938. The BBC Arabic World Service and Radio Berlin followed t in 1938 and 1939 respectively. Limited access to news and the limited availability of both Radio units and electricity may have prevented the formation of a Saudi public opinion on Palestine in 1930s and early 1940s.xxiv It is more likely that the population received news about Palestine from nomadic bedouins crossing to Iraq and Transjordan, and merchants travelling from the Hijaz  and Najd to Egypt, Iraq, Syria  or  ports of the Gulf. Muslim and Arab pilgrims coming to Mecca would also have been an important source of  news.

When George Rendel discussed the plan of the partition of Palestine with  Ibn Saud’s Minister, Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, he reported that the latter was extremely depressed at this communication. Wahba told Rendel that

 

‘He clearly expected a violent reaction from Ibn Saud and more than once expressed the hope that Sir R. Bullard  would have been able to explain matters to His Majesty and represent them in a more tolerant light before the king heard the news from other sources….He [Wahba] clearly anticipated that Anglo-Saudi relations might seriously deteriorate’.xxv

Ibn Saud’s letters to Britain, together with minutes of meetings held with his most relevant and active functionaries Yusif Yasin and Hafiz Wahba, indicate a  clear message.  Ibn Saud was concerned with the Partition of Palestine only in so far as this partition strengthened his Hashemite arch enemy, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan.  He was clear when he threatened to revive his territorial claims over towns such as Maan and Aqaba, now under Hashemite rule, only in those circumstances whereby Amir Abdullah was seen to pose a threat to the Saudi monarch. The emancipation from Britain of Amir Abdullah  was  seen as undermining his personal interests. He insisted and repeated that ‘the Partition of Palestine would almost certainly make the Amir Abdullah an independent sovereign with a considerable accession of territory to the West of Jordan’.xxvi It goes without saying that official Saudi publications in which selected letters and correspondence are reprinted completely ignore this dimension that shaped Saudi policy on Palestine throughout the two decades prior to 1947-8.

In fact Saudi historiography remains absolutely silent on Amir Abdullah of Transjordan and the rivalry with Ibn Saud. Wherever there was mention of the Hashemites, this historiography presented them as people with intrigues that aim to undermine Saudi tranquillity and peace. In one publication, Saudi historian al-Uthaymin outlines Saudi-Jordanian relations and highlights that Amir Abdullah had close contacts with the tribes of Hijaz and as he lost his influence after the incorporation of Hijaz in the Saudi realm, it was most natural for him to adopt an antagonistic policy towards Ibn Saud. The author emphasises that ‘Abdullah’s tribes continued to raid Najdi trading caravans, under Ibn Saud’s authority. The Saudi Ikhwan replied and raided those tribes but Jordanian tribes, for example bani Sakhr and the Howitat continued their aggression on Saudi territory’.xxvii This historiography remains silent on how for example raids by tribes turned ‘Saudi’ with the drawing of the boundaries between the realm of Ibn Saud on the one hand and that of Iraq and Transjordan on the other, were often encouraged to raid the other side. It was often Saudi-Hashemite enmity and rivalry rather than religious zeal, xenophobia, Jihadi effervescence, and ignorance of alien concepts such as territorial boundaries that determined tribal raids in the frontier area between Saudi Arabia and its northern neighbours. 

Ibn Saud’s selected letters and sermons project an image of a King who endeavoured to influence international public opinion, mainly Britain and the US (Later in the 1940s), in order to safeguard Jerusalem from Zionist intrusion. In his correspondence with Britain, the King over-exaggerated the pressure of his own people. However, British assessment of these pressures rightly confirmed that they were not as dangerous as the King wanted Britain to believe. One is more likely to agree with this evaluation given the weakness of several potential troublemakers, for example the ulama of Najd, the tribal population of the northern provinces or the notables of the Hijaz, all were successfully pacified by Ibn Saud before the 1948 war. The ulama had already been co-opted after the serious Ikhwan rebellion of 1927 whereas the Hijazi tribal rebellion of Ibn Rifada  in 1931 was successfully put  down. Hijazis were possibly still under the heavy loss of the World economic recession of 1933, which almost destroyed their revenues from the pilgrimage season with the decrease in the number of pilgrims reaching Mecca during that year and even afterwards.xxviii

 More significant to Saudi policy on Palestine was the prospect of Amir Abdullah emerging as an independent sovereign. In Ibn Saud’s  opinion, ‘it is only the presence of Major Glubb and the British frontier force  that has been responsible for the maintenance of peace during the past few years on the somewhat artificial and ill-defined de facto boundary which separates Transjordan and Saudi Arabia’.xxix  British assessment of the attitude of Ibn Saud on the partition of Palestine clearly reiterated that ‘it is true that Ibn Saud’s immediate reaction toward partition were rather against the difficulties which the proposal to make the Amir Abdullah an independent sovereign would have caused him personally than against the injustice which, in the eyes of all Moslem and Arab opinion, was being inflicted on the Arab race’.xxx  Therefore, it is this personal enmity rather than the concern with broad Arab and Muslim causes that determined Saudi policy on Palestine.

Ibn Saud’s deference to British policies on Palestine required him to refuse proposals to hold a secret meeting in Mecca to discuss the issue with several Arab personalities who were intending to perform the pilgrimage in 1937.  Bullard wrote ‘The king had refused to allow it, alleging that Mecca was a place for religious worship not for political conferences….he never embarked on any policy unless he was sure it was reasonable and he did not wish to embarrass His Majesty’s Government…if the holding of a conference had been the course to pursue, he  would have proposed it himself and not followed the suggestion of others’.xxxi 

When the second World war broke out, Ibn Saud had already made it clear to Britain that  the prospect of independent Hashemite realms threatened his security more than any other matter relevant to Arab public opinion, including the question of Palestine. He feared a British military withdrawal from territories where his arch enemies had already been installed. He trusted the British government to keep his own historical enemies under control. 

The Second World War 1939-1945

Just before the Second World War started, Ibn Saud intended to form a large army trained on modern lines. This plan, however, did not go very far. Negotiations to obtain ten thousand rifles from Germany and ten million rounds of small arms ammunition were cancelled.xxxii It was only in 1946 that the first British Military Mission to train Saudi personnel for the regular Saudi army was completed. Saudi Minister of Defence Prince Mansur Ibn Abdulaziz expressed his ‘gratification at the standards attained during the courses’.xxxiii However, with the situation in Palestine becoming more critical,  Saudi cancellation of an order to purchase further equipment form Britain was regretted yet there was a relief that ‘an Arab country to whom we [Britain] have no treaty obligations, is not placing these orders for military supplies with us’.xxxiv The assessment of Saudi military capabilities emphasised that in general the army remained unorganised and consisted entirely of untrained men. Relief was expressed in London when the purchase of more vehicles and equipment did not materialise later in 1947 because of the deteriorating situation in Palestine. The British feared that such arms in the hands of Saudis may find a way of getting to Palestine. Their fear was unrealistic as later events proved.

In 1942 Ibn Saud received an overture from Amir Abdullah who wrote to the king to express his worries regarding those Muslims who had been attacked during the war and the lands where “we have national and economic interests. He mentioned his desire to meet King Ibn Saud  as he felt that ‘all should join in some movement to assist those people’. He hoped that ‘the times would have enabled us to meet but I learn that this is not to be, although I have not abandoned hope’.  Ibn Saud replied that ‘it is fortunate that our connections with the British government are as perfect as be desired…it would give us greatest happiness to cause a meeting between your highness and myself…when matters have returned to normal and we are at rest’.xxxv  Ibn Saud was obviously not ready for a meeting with Amir Abdullah, especially during times of uncertainty, caused by the war. Ibn Saud’s  meeting with Amir Abdullah  did not take place until  June 1948, not only after the end of the war but also after it became clear that the Hashemite of Jordan lost some of their prestige in the Arab and Muslim word  following the al-nakba. Ibn Saud continued to regard Amir Abdullah with suspicion. He always  feared ‘Hashemite intrigues’ among Hijazis, who according to Yusif Yasin, resented the King’s neglect of this region in favour of Najd. British reports referred to the merchants of the Hijaz becoming resentful after seeing the Hajj revenues being diverted in the direction of Najd. British sources acknowledged that  Hashemite intrigues among Hijaziz still loyal to their old masters undoubtedly existed, though probably not on a dangerous scale.xxxvi 

Ibn Saud resisted any attempt to group the emerging newly independent Arab countries in any form of union. He insisted that he preferred a policy that achieves the independence of each Arab state in a manner that would ensure each state retaining its own identity. Iraq Prime Minister Nuri Pasha telegraphed the king regarding attitudes of Syria towards a union with Palestine and Tansjordan after the end of the French mandate. Ibn Saud insisted that he did not support any union of this kind. He claimed that ‘the uniting of these people under one central government is a proposal so full of difficulties.. that would cause dissention and dispute rather than agreement and harmony’.xxxvii  Both Ibn Saud, together with Syrian nationalists resisted Hashemite desires to spread their influence over the newly independent Syria. Most importantly Ibn Saud refused any unity among the newly emerging Arab nation states and leaned towards the formation of the Arab League, the idea behind it is  believed to be orchestrated by Britain immediately after the outbreak of World war II.xxxviii A report on Arab Unity prepared by Chatham House in London for the French Embassy assessed the prospect of such unity and potential candidates to lead the Union. The report claimed that it is unfortunate that Amir Abdullah, the son of the late King Hussein entitled him to due consideration for leadership’ but ‘it is an unfortunate fact  that the majority of Arabs do not regard him with favour as a possible ruler in a wider sphere than his present one’. As for Ibn Saud the report mentioned Ibn Saud’s suspicion of any discussion of Arab unity, especially that taking place between Iraqi and Egyptian premiers without prior reference to him. He was reported to have said that such discussions reduced him to the level of the Lebanese President.xxxix  Ibn Saud obviousdly could not accept a role perhaps more suitable to a minor leader, for example the Lebanese Prime Minister.

There was a realisation in Riyadh that the King should appear to show more  interest in Arab affairs. In March 1943 he gave an interview to the American paper ‘Life’ in which he tried to show that he was concerned with matters related to the future of Palestine, as a result of which he received congratulatory telegrams  from Arab nationalists in Egypt and Syria. Ibn Saud  went as far as to insist that any unity that compromises the identity of each Arab state should be rejected. He claimed that Arab unity  under one leadership would be a waste of time leading to nothing but what would cause dissention and dispute rather than agreement and harmony. In effect he ‘aimed at maintaining a balance of power and avoiding aggression by one Arab state against another. Ibn Saud promised to co-operate with the project of a regional Arab council on two conditions: the Hashemites keeping their hands off Syria and Palestine, and any measure in support of Arab unity must not obstruct the allies war effort.  During the War, Ibn Saud made it clear to the British that he was averse to raising the issue of Palestine at a time when it might embarrass the allies.xl  The report was sent to the Foreign Office for approval. Mr Bowman of the Research Department made few comments, but it was too late. The report had already been dispatched.

 

The situation in Palestine became more volatile after the second World War, Ibn Saud wrote to Prime Minister Churchill in 1945. He summed up his position on Palestine:

‘The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine will be a strong attack on the Arabs and a threat to peace. It is inevitable that unrest will dominate between Arabs and Jews. If the patience of Arabs run out, and they give up hope, they will definitely defend their land and the future generation…we congratulate the allies on their victory and hope that they are aware of Arab rights in Palestine’. xli

 In various sermons addressing Saudis, Ibn Saud announced that the British government was facing the ungrateful Zionists. The latter threatened British interests in the region. He equally emphasised that he saw no benefit in compounding British difficulties in Palestine where justice for Palestinians must be established. xlii

In 1946, Ibn Saud wrote to President Truman that ‘I am distressed over the Congress support of Jewish immigration to Palestine…Congress must have been affected by Zionist propaganda. Zionists not only threaten Palestine but they  are also a threat to Saudi Arabia’.xliii  In Ibn Saud’s correspondence and meetings with American officials, he saw a window of opportunity. He confessed

‘Since I was born and started to regain the reign of my fathers and grandfathers, I have not known any power other than Britain. She was my friend. I saw from her what pleased me and she saw from me what pleased her. When the War (World War II) broke out, I supported her and she trusted me. I advised my Arab brothers not to engage in any activity that would undermine Britain’.xliv

Once again Ibn Saud used the ulama card to emphasise his difficulties over Palestine. He claimed that his ulama had received letters from other Muslim ulama who ‘are astonished as a result of my support for Britain at a time when Britain supports the Jews. I explained that there are dangers facing our nation if the enemies of Britain win the war. They ask me whether I am sure that Britain will not support the Jews after its victory. I always say that I cannot guarantee anything. I repeat that if Arabs do not do anything against Britain, Britain will be equitable’. xlv Ibn Saud asserted he would not let Saudis fight in Palestine as long as Britain remains the mandatory power because acts of aggression will be in these circumstances directed against Britain. The departure of Britain from Palestine would inevitably free Arabs from their pledges of friendship to Britain, according to Ibn Saud.

Saudi Arabia and the war in Palestine 1947-1948

Arab leaders, including Ibn Saud were warned by the British government not to engage in any acts of aggression against Britain. In a telegram sent to Baghdad, Amman, Cairo, Jeddah, and Beirut on 2 December 1947, Arab leader were informed that ‘His Majesty’s Government are counting on the assurances which have been given by various Arab spokesman, that there is no intention of causing trouble in Palestine while we are still in control there….we are bound to repress disorder whatever, quarter it arises’.xlvi  Ibn Saud replied that the ‘Saudi Arabian government would do nothing to embarrass the British until they divested themselves of responsibility in Palestine’.xlvii  Furthermore, Britain insisted that while they were in Palestine, Arab governments should not only refrain from sending army units but should also restrain any of their nationals who try to make their way into Palestine for purposes of causing disorder, as well as organizations and individuals in their territories who try to incite disorder from outside’.xlviii  Ibn Saud assured Britain that he had no intention in creating more troubles for the British government.  His son, Prince Saud, delivered his father’s message to Mr Trott in Jeddah.

After the United Nations adopted the partition resolution on 29 November 1947, war broke out on 30 November 1947. Like most Arab leaders, Ibn Saud realised that his cautious and indecisive policy of the 1930s and early 1940s, would no longer be sufficient.

After the UN decision to partition Palestine, the Arab league held meetings in Cairo between 8-17 December 1947. Saudi Arabia joined other Arab state members in rejecting the partition and signed the famous communiqué stating that ‘the United Nations included the best Arab land in the Jewish state and put half a million Arabs under Zionist rule. The mandate power removed Arab weapons and gave Arabs to Zionists. The Arab state will stand by the side of their brothers ..in order to thwart the partition of Palestine’.xlix Saudi Arabia also agreed to be part of the Arab League’s military plan to defend Palestine. In the meetings Arab states decided to send 3000 Arab volunteers to help the Palestinian mujahidin, in addition to establishing jaysh al-inqath, the Rescue Arab Army to be established by taha al-Hashimi, Ismail Safwat, and Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Arab state armies were to be sent to support the four units of Palestinians inside Palestine.

Saudi Arabia accepted to pay 20% of the cost of military operations.  Representing Saudi Arabia in Arab League meetings was Prince Faysal who supported a suggestion to establish a local Palestinian administration, which was rejected by the Iraqi representative.l The Arab League agreed that Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan must open their frontiers for Arab armies.

While Ibn Saud refused to allow any demonstrations either in Hijaz or  Najd to take place in support of Palestine, it was reported that a special fund was proposed to be created in order to help Palestinians. The British government, however, informed the company approached to set up this fund, Gellatly, Hankey and Company Limited,  that it should not join what was essentially a Muslim religious undertaking. It seems that this fund was the ‘only outward action which the king is permitting’. li 

 

Ibn Saud’s  main concern in 1947 was not Palestine but a local incident that was reported to the British government, with the intention of seeking assurance that the Hashemites of Iraq would be pressured to stop their ‘intrigues’, this time among the Shammar of north Arabia. Ibn Saud’s suspicion of the Iraqi monarch continued in 1947 when he announced to the British that two members of the Al-Rashid family, Saud and Abdulaziz, descendents of the formerly powerful heads of the  Rashidi emirates of  Hail, fled to Iraq. Ibn Saud attributed  the incident of the Rashidis taking sanctuary with the King of Iraq to the ‘evil machinations of his traditional enemies ….he said that the names of the Hashemite emissaries who led astray the two young Rashid Shaikhs were well known and would be given to us ‘.lii However, the flight of the two Rashidi brothers to Iraq had nothing to do with Hashemite intrigues. According to several Rashidi sources, the two Rashidis fled to Iraq after attending a party at the residence of Prince Nasir, one of Ibn Saud’s sons. Immediately after the party Abdullah ibn Rashidliii and two invited guests died in mysterious circumstances. For fear of being drawn into the incident, the brothers of Abdullah Ibn Rashid, Saud and Abdulaziz sought help from Shammar bedouins who arranged for them to cross the border to Iraq.liv  They both feared that they would be eliminated by Ibn Saud. The two Rashidi brothers escaped after suspecting a conspiracy to kill them in Ibn Saud’s capital. Their fears were not unfounded as Muhammad ibn Rashid, the son of the last ruler of Hail, was assassinated  in 1952 in the Saudi capital in mysterious circumstances. 

Ibn Saud’s suspicion of the Hashemite of Transjordan continued to grow even after war broke out in Palestine. According to British sources, ‘the king never reconciled himself to the assumption of independent status by King Abdullah of Transjordan and Iraq…King Abdullah’s unflattering references to Ibn Saud in his published memoirs were a permanent source of intense irritation in Riyadh’.lv

According to official narratives Ibn Saud threatened to cancel all oil concessions with American companies if no assurances were given over the future of Palestine, a position he was congratulated on by Arab nationalists in Syria.lvi Of course the oil companies themselves took no such threats seriously. 

Official history exaggerates Saudi support when it describes mahrajanat al-jihad, Jihad festivals,  allegedly held in various Saudi cities and oases in support of the Palestinian cause. It is claimed that one such meeting was attended by famous Saudi religious scholar sheikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Abd al-Latif Al-Shaykh and Saudi Prince Muhammad ibn Saud, both called for volunteers to go to Palestine. Within two days 2000 names were registered. The number unrealistically rose to 200,000 men who were described as ‘ready to perform Jihad and sacrifice their lives’. Friday sermons were dedicated to encouraging people to donate funds for the Palestinian cause. In the Saudi official narrative, the ulama are applauded for playing a crucial role in the mobilisation for Jihad.lvii

By 1948 it seems that the Saudi government was reaching a point where diplomacy, foreign relations and internal affairs were conducted by the King himself. Having benefited from the first flow of oil revenue, the king, however,  had ‘no sense of figures: 10,000 or 10 million mean much the same to him: and his weakness is exploited to the full by his many parasites. Sheikh Yusif Yasin, who carried the burden of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ‘no longer feels able to deal with the many technical problems which now frequently arise…the King retained within his own family the position of ultimate responsibility for the administration and security’.lviii  Together with rumours concerning the King’s health, it seemed that Saudi Arabia was not ready to face the challenge of the coming Palestine War. British reports continued to point to dissatisfaction in Hejaz, that Ibn Saud  often ascribed to Hashemite intrigues, but could well be attributed to the neglect of this region by the King’s Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Sulayman, whose monopolistic measures were believed to be resented by  Hijazi merchant families. 

Was Saudi Arabia in a position to send ‘armies into Palestine’ which ‘did best in the Palestine fighting’ as claimed in a Times article on 1 July 1948? According to British reports, such statements were so ‘fantastic that it seemed pointless to comment on their improbability…Saudi troops number 1200 in Palestine (or Egypt) and another 100 are being trained. They went off with very little equipment and no ammunition. The men were almost all untrained and quite useless for modern warfare. Some of them did not even know how to fire a rifle’. lix Later Brigadir Baird confirmed that eight armoured cars and a number of trucks were despatched at the end of July 1948 by sea to Egypt.

Against British assessment of official Saudi military contribution to the war, official history tells us a different story. According to Saudi sources, troops were sent by air from Jeddah airport to Cairo. Equipment and heavy machinery  arrived in Suez by sea.  Minister of Defence, Prince Mansur Ibn Abdulaziz, was in charge of the military mission that was divided into two units.  Saudi  troops were assembled in Arish and sent through Rafah to Gaza where they engaged the enemy for seven days in several battles. The encounter led ‘to the martyrdom of Salih Buhayri, Abdullah al-Tasan, Abdulrahman al-Shar, Ahmad Nasir, and Jabir Omri, in addition to 134 dead among the volunteers’. lx

The efficacy of the Saudi military involvement in the war remained subject to speculation. While there is a confirmation of the presence of 1200 regular troops and a further 500 irregulars who were sent to Egypt to fight under Egyptian command, reports indicated that the number of volunteers from northern Najd and other regions of Saudi Arabia was higher. Reports from Jeddah mentioned that 3000 tribesmen were ready to leave for Palestine and that they had made their own arrangements, not under the aegis of the Saudi government, though perhaps the government connived their going.lxi  Saudi reports confirmed that around 513 volunteers joined the Jihad in Palestine. They initially went as individuals but were later organised in a Saudi fawj, under the leadership of Fahd al-Marik, who was honoured upon his return to Saudi Arabia. He wrote a book on the Saudi volunteers in Palestine and listed the names of martyrs. The narrative about Saudi participation in the Palestinian war offered a way out of the dilemma of Ibn Saudi which arose immediately after he suppressed Jihad at home when he terminated the rebellion of his Jihadi ikhwan fighters in 1927. Al-Marik wrote about the new volunteers and the martyrs who flamed the imagination as vanguards fulfilling the ethos of the state of monotheism abroad. He justified the grouping of Saudi volunteers in one Saudi unit rather than allowing them to disperse with other Arab volunteers  on the basis of efficiency. lxii It was obvious, however, that the grouping of the volunteers was motivated by political concerns and fear of merging the volunteers in one Arab military command, possibly under Syrian or Iraqi military command.lxiii Many of the volunteers mentioned in al-Marik’s book were reported to have received medals from the Syrian army. The Saudi embassy in Damascus was put in charge of facilitating the repatriation of martyrs as it co-ordinated its activities with al-Shuba al-Siyasiyya in Saudi Arabia. The performance of both regular troops and volunteers remained controversial. Saudi sources inflated their heroism while British sources dismissed any valuable contribution. In one British report, it was stated that ‘the Saudi Arabian military contribution to the Palestine fighting was negligible, and their contingent obtained publicity only when a United Nations observer and his pilot met their death at their hands at Gaza airport’.lxiv The celebration of the contribution of Saudi volunteers in the Rescue Army is hailed in alternative Saudi narratives, mainly in the accounts of Saudi leftists, nationalists and Nasserite opposition figures of the 1960s as one of the first popular  military action that was soon appropriated by Ibn Saud to boost his own pan-Arab credentials.

While the Saudi government preferred to send its regular troops to fight under the Egyptian flag, the passage of Saudi irregulars and volunteers to Palestine was controversial. It was most natural and logical for members of the northern tribesmen to assemble in al-Jauf and proceed to Transjordan. However, the Saudi government wanted to move them to Syrian army centre Qatana, west of Damascus. Fuad Hamza visited Amman to check whether Amir Abdullah had any objections. The Amir was not apparently pleased at the idea that the Syrians receiving reinforcement but he raised no objections. The Saudis did not want to send these volunteers to Egypt, ‘where the regular troops suffered heavy losses as a result of having been put in an unduly exposed position by the Egyptian command’. lxv British officials in Jeddah pointed to Ibn Saud that the volunteers were useless in a situation of modern warfare. They insisted that they were untrained and will probably cause trouble wherever they went. The king was not convinced. 

Saudis responded to Arab defeat in Palestine, now referred to as al-nakba, by establishing Lajnat Ighathat Filistin, under the directorship of Prince Faysal. After a speech in his Palace in Taif, the committee received five million Riyals which was transferred to the Arab League, now co-ordinating Arab relief efforts. According to Saudi sources, this sum excluded the official aid dispatched to Palestinian refugees and to jaysh al-inqath al-arabi al-filistini, Arab-Palestinian Rescue Army.lxvi  Ibn Saud gave instruction to employ Palestinian refugees in the new oil industry. Thousands of applications were received in the recruitment agency in Beirut; only several hundreds were recruited by ARAMCO, the main Saudi employer at the time.lxvii

Ibn Saud and Abdullah under the shadow of Palestine

Ibn Saud’s concern with the Palestinian problem had always assumed secondary importance because his primary concern, which eventually developed into an obsession, was with the growing power of the Hashemite family. According to British sources, he ‘has never reconciled himself to the assumption of independent status by King Abdullah…King Abdullah’s personal ambitions to achieve a Greater Syria  were a permanent source of irritation in Riyadh’.lxviii King’s Abdullah’s unflattering remarks on Ibn Saud, published in his memoirs, were a permanent scar poisoning relations between the two competing houses, a competition that had tarnished Arab efforts to deal with  Palestine. Hopes that the visit of Prince Faysal to Amman in 1946 might lead to the initiation of diplomatic relations were disappointed. 

 

With the contours of the defeat of Arab armies in Palestine looming but not yet confirmed, two archenemies put their historical enmities aside, at least in public. Having perhaps lost any hope to reverse the course of military events in Palestine and having been assured that King Abdullah of Transjordan’s army is preoccupied in Palestine, after resisting British pressure for too long, Ibn Saud accepted to receive His Majesty in Riyadh on 27-30 June 1948. This was perhaps one of the most important event in Saudi foreign relations in that year. The meeting materialised perhaps only after Ibn Saud realised that Abdullah was too occupied with Palestine to pose any threat in Hijaz. Several hypotheses had been put for the sudden and unexpected show of Abdullah in the Saudi capital. Having reached old age, Ibn Saud may have wanted to close the chapter of enmity with the Hashemites to prepare the grounds for the reign of his son Saud, whom he may not have considered to be an equal match to Abdullah’s intrigues. Alternatively Ibn Saud may have been motivated by a desire to consolidate his relations with Britain at a time when he anticipated difficulties with the Americans, an unpredictable and largely unfamiliar new force on the Arabian scene.lxix Ibn Saud wanted Britain to arm him in such a way as to match Abdullah’s army at a time when Ibn Saud was beginning to realise that his grandiose and ambition together with the security of his realm, were no longer served by his traditional tribal warriors.  

King Abdullah landed at Dhahran and was met by Crown Prince Saud, who accompanied the monarch to Riyadh the following day. Ibn Saud was eager to demonstrate to Abdullah his wealth as he ‘presented him on his departure with 100,000 sovereigns as a proof that the country did after all contain something besides sand’.lxx  Abdullah wanted assurances that the 3000 so called irregulars waiting in Riyadh to join the mujahidin in Palestine would not be allowed to do so. The visit was dubbed a success by both the official press and a  Hijazi dissident who admitted  that  the visit ‘would end any separatist tendencies between the Hijaz and Nejd and would allow the country to develop on a proper basis of unity’.lxxi

The meeting had the approval of the Britain, who had been urging Ibn Saud to reconcile with King Abdullah. However, the meeting was a surprise even to members of the Saudi royal family. Prince Faysal, later King, was in London at the time and it was reported that he had no knowledge of any arrangement in preparation for the historical encounter.lxxii After four days, the two monarchs issued a joint communiqué ‘affirming their support for the Arab League and their determination to ensure the independence of an Arab Palestine’.lxxiii  Such public declarations were to be followed by hundred others over the last half century. One important aspect of the meeting revolved around Ibn Saud recognising King Abdullah as an independent monarch as he accepted to exchange diplomatic representatives. For a long time Ibn Saud regarded the British representative in Jeddah as responsible for the protection of Jordanian interests. King Abdullah always insisted that the Iraqi mission in Saudi Arabia should be responsible for this task. Ibn Saud refused for obvious reasons. Ibn Saud recognised Abdullah and received his diplomatic representatives only after the latter was being seen by Ibn Saud as having been confined to a territory that would not give him more legitimacy and recognition among Arabs. Six months after this historic visit on the 7 January 1949, the end of hostilities in Palestine was declared and in the same year Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan signed armistice treaties with Israel. As a country with no common borders with Israel, no armistice treaty was signed with Saudi Arabia.

The narration of Saudi involvement in the Palestine War was written from the point of view of a regime that had strictly narrow national interests defended against not only those of its neighbours but also against the interests of the Palestinians. With the mounting Arab nationalist sentiments exemplified by the rise of Nasser, the Saudi regime was inevitably counted among those regimes that ‘sold Palestine’ to the Jews, fought Arab unity and humiliated the Arab nation. While other Arab monarchs and presidents lost their lives or ousted following al-nakba, Ibn Saud survived the Palestinian defeat and died a natural death.  The flirtation of his successor, King Saud, with Nassir in the 1960s  should be understood as a by-product of the early Arab monarchical defeat in Palestine, but this is another chapter in another book. 

Over Palestine the Saudi king demonstrated a remarkable servile attitude to the British against the rhetoric of the Jihad that was meant to defend the holy land and the Palestinians. The fact that such hypocrisy was not evident to his subjects reflects the development of Saudi society at the time.   The King frequently voiced his perplexity on the adopted British political  line and even explicitly warned of serious consequences and problems that British policies, in his view, would cause. Ibn Saud would eventually back the British government, while finding a way to present ‘his’ decisions to the Arab audience in a way that would not damage his so-called ‘prestige’.

Saving face and personal interest, keeping himself firmly in power, and contrasting the rise of the Hashemites in regional policy: this appears to be the horizon of Ibn Saud’s political vision. To achieve this, Ibn Saud had to keep as close as possible to the mighty regional power, Britain, a position that the Al-Saud had maintained until the present day. Alliance with Britain was important for balancing with the Hashemites and over regional powers. This was needed to  keep Saudi Arabia firmly under his rule.  He saw Arab unity as another name for regional power struggle in the shadow of Britain. He had a very pragmatic view of Islamic solidarity.  It is difficult to know what Islam meant for him, apart from legitimation formula for consolidating his prestige internally and externally.

At the time Saudi society had no indigenous Arab nationalists to cause trouble for Ibn Saud. This society oscillated and still oscillates between narrow primordial identities revolving around kin, tribe, sect and region and an ambiguous umami global Islamic identity encouraged by religious sermons delivered by Ibn Saud’s ulama who had very limited and parochial education. Both religious discourse and official rhetoric and later statistics documenting Saudi spending on Muslim causes created the illusion of defending Palestinians. Saudis subscribed to the two opposed identities without being able to produce Arab national sentiments, historically a product of direct colonial rule and mandates. As Saudi Arabia was justified under the pretext of purifying the heartland of Islam from blasphemy, there was no room for an overarching Arab identity. With the finalising of borders in the region, Britain closed the gates of Jihad for Saudis, who had to contend with ‘tawhid revolution’ in one region in the Arab world. In later years Saudis proved to be more easily mobilised to defend Muslims against communism than by defending Arab national interests, a situation still true today. During the Palestine crisis, British officials never doubted that Ibn Saud was ‘their man’. If ever they had doubts on him, it was on his acumen as a politician, not on his ‘friendship’. They took his comments and sentiments seriously, not to follow them, but to make up their own mind on the regional and political climate. British political strategy of ‘divide and rule’ – while playing the role of the neutral arbiter, could not have found a better partner/accomplice than Ibn Saud, himself playing several roles ranging from the pious Imam, the tribal patriarch, and the wise and cautious Muslim leader. His role in British  designs was most essential, due to his early occupation, with British approval, of the Two Holy Mosques.

i See Maktabat al-Dara al-Miawiyya, Isdarat Darat al-Malik Abdulaziz, nd.

ii Saudi documents and Ibn Saud’s letters on the Palestinian crisis were published by Fahd al-Samari, who led a research team to publish all Saudi documents on Palestine. See Fahd al-Samari wathaiq al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya al-tarikhiyya:  al-qadiyya al-filistiniyya 1929-1953, Riyadh: darat al-Malik Abdulaziz 1422H. 

iii Andrew Ryan 30 July 1932, CO732/67/7, Relations between Ibn Saud and HMG.

iv Ibid: Sir Andrew Ryan 30 July 1932, CO732/67/7, Relations between Ibn Saud and HMG

v Abdullah al-Uthaymin tarikh al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya, third year secondary education text book, Riyadh: Wizarat al-maarif, 1993, pp. 134-135

vi Al-Safafi Ahmad al-Mursi Min khutab al-malik Abdulaziz Darat al-Malik Abdulaziz, Riyadh, 1985.

vii Ibid: 167. Letter from Ibn Saud to Amin al-Huseini 19 February 1932.

viii On the 1935-37 turbulence in Palestine, see Basheer Nafi “Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam: A Reformist and a Rebel Leader’, Journal of Islamic Studies 8:2 (1997) pp 185-215.

ix Telegram to Sir Andrew Ryan (Jedda) FO to Saudi Arabia 1 May 1936Air 2/1858.

x Sir Andrew Ryan 30 July 1932, CO732/67/7, Relations between Ibn Saud and HMG.

xi Sir Andrew Ryan  30 April 1936 Air 2/1858.

xii Sir Andrew Ryan 30 April 1937 Air 2/1858.

xiii Min khutab al-malik: 268. Letter from Ibn Saud to British Government 1 January 1937.

xiv Ibid: 271. Letter from Ibn Saud to British Government 1 January 1937.

xv Ibid: 280. Letter from Ibn Saud to British Government 20 January 1938.

xvi Ibid: 281. Letter from Ibn Saud to British Government 20 January 1938.

xvii Mr Eden to Mr Calvert (Jedda) Eastern (Arabia) 7 July 1936 Air 1/1858.

xviii Min khutab al-malik 1 January 1937, pp. 270-271.

xix Min al-khutab al-malik  September 1936, pp. 275.

xx FO 29 July 1936, Calvert Esq, Jedda Air 2/1858.

xxi Telegram from Political Resident (Bahrain) to Foreign Office 14 July 1937. Air 2/1858.

xxii Telegram from Sir Bullard (Jedda) to Foreign Office 24 March 1937, Air 2/ 1858.

xxiii Arab Movement, transmit despatch to Jedda no 421 regarding Saudi attitude to FO, 4 November 1937, G.W. Rendel FO 141/676, 1397 Arab Movement. 

xxiv Rosemary Said Zahlan ‘Filistin wa al-khalij’ al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi volume 8, 2002, pp. 36-52. On how Kuwait and Bahrain responded to the Palestine crisis, see Rosemary Said Zahlan “The Gulf States and the Palestine Problem 1936-48” in Arab Studies Quarterly volume 3, number 1, winter 1981, pp. 1-21.

xxv Minutes by George Rendel,  conversation with Saudi Minister regarding Palestine support, FO 141/676, 1937

xxvi Arab Movement, George Rendel, letter to Colonial Office regarding alleged activity on the Transjordan-Saudi frontier directed against Palestine FO 8 November 1937, FO 141/676, 1937, Arab Movement.

xxvii Abdullah al-Uthaymin Tarikh al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya, volume II, Riyadh: Maktabat al-Ubaykan, 1995, pp. 267-272.

xxviii On the decline of the number of pilgrims to Mecca during the economic recession, see Fuad Hamza al-bilad al-arabiyya al-saudiyya, Riyadh: Maktabat al-Nasr al-Haditha, 1968, second edition,  pp. 219

xxix Arab Movement letter to Colonial Office regarding alleged activity, FO 8 November 1937, FO 141/676.

xxx Arab Movement Transmit Despatch to Jedda no.421 regarding Saudi Attitude to FO, 4 November 1937,  FO 141/676, 1937.

xxxi HM Minister’s Interview with king Abdulaziz, British Legation, Jedda, 18 December 1937, FO 141/676, 1937.

xxxii From Bullard, Ibn Saud’s armed forces, British Legation, Jedda 29 November 1939, no. 168, FO 371/24589, Political Eastern Saudi Arabia.

xxxiii FO 371/52826 Saudi Arabia 1946, British Legation, Jedda 8 June 1946.

xxxiv FO 371/62101 Saudi Arabia 1947, file 4382, Reorganisation of Saudi Arabian Army, 18 October 1947.

xxxv Relations between Ibn Saud and Amir Abdullah, From Office of British Resident, Amman 25 April 1942, FO 371/ 31459, 1942.

xxxvi FO 371/68779 Annual Report, British Embassy, Jedda, Mr Trott  to Bevin, 12 February 1948.

xxxvii FO 371/45237 Eastern 1945, General, file number 3

xxxviii FO 371/45237 Eastern 1945, Arab Unity, pp. 1-2

xxxix FO 371/45237 Eastern 1945, Arab Unity, pp 5

xl FO/371/45237 Eastern 1945, Arab Unity, pp. 6

xli Min khutab al-malik pp. 300

xlii Mukhtarat min al-khutab al-malakiyya, volume I, Riyadh: Maktabat al-Dara al-Miawiyya, 1999, pp. 143

xliii Min khutab al-malik pp. 302-301

xliv Min khutab al-malik, pp. 307

xlv Min khutab al-malik, pp. 307-308

xlvi FO 371/61580 Easter 1947, General FO draft telegram, 2 December 1947.

xlvii FO 371/61580 Easter 1947, General Arab activities in connection with Palestine from Jedda to FO, Mr A.C. Trott. 10 December 1947.

xlviii FO 371/61580 Eastern 1947 FO draft telegram 2 December 1947.

xlix Abdulfatah Abu Aliyya al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya wa qadiyat filistin, Riyadh: al-Dara 1999, pp. 313-314.

l Abdulfatah Abu Aliyya al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya wa qadiyat filistin, Riyadh: al-Dara 1999, pp 317.

li FO 3371/62155 Easter, 1947 From Jedda to FO Mr A.C. Trott 9 December 1947.

lii FO 371/62112 Eastern 1947 Saudi Arabia, Mr A.C. Trott to Mr Bevin 12 December 1947.

liii Abdullah Ibn Mitab Ibn Rashid was the eleventh amir of Hail. He surrendered to Ibn Saud in 1921. He moved to Riyadh while his cousin Muhammad Ibn Talal Ibn Rashid continued resistance until November 1921. For further details, see Madawi Al-Rasheed Politics in an Arabia Oasis: the Rashidis of Saudi Arabia London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, pp. 64

liv Both Talal ibn Rashid, the cousin of the two Rashidi brothers who escaped to Iraq and the daughter of one of them confirm this story.

lv FO 371/68779 Annual Report 1947 A.C. Trott British Embassy Jedda to Bevin 12 February 1948. This is a reference to Abdullah’s memoirs. See Abdullah ibn al-Hussein Muthakarati Amman: al-Ahliyya 1989 edition. 

lvi Khayriyya Qasim jawanib min siyasat al-malik Abdulaziz tijah al-qadaya al-Arabiyya Riyadh: al-Dara1419, pp. 80.

lvii Abdulfatah Abu Aliyya al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya wa qadiyat filistin, Riyadh: al-Dara 1999, pp 321

lviii FO 371/68779 Annual Report Trott, British Embassy Jedda to Bevin12 February 1948

lix FO 371/68788 Eastern 1948 Saudi Arabia file number 9684 British Embassy Jedda participation of Saudi Troops in the Fighting in Palestine. 11 July 1948.

lx Salih Jamal al-Hariri al-jaysh al-saudi fi filistin  (1950), reprinted by  Darat al-Malik Abdulaziz,  Riyadh 2001. Pp. 59.

lxi FO 371/68788 Eastern 1948 Saudi Arabia file number 9684  from Trott, Jedda, 21 August 1948.

lxii Abdulrahim Jamus allijan al-shabiyya li musadat mujahidi filistin  fi al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya Darat al-Malik Abdulaziz Riyadh, 1422H. Pp. 18-19

lxiii Abdulfatah Abu Aliyya al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya wa qadiyat filistin Riyadh: al-Dara 1999, pp 323

lxiv FO 371/75505, 1949 Easter, Saudi Arabia, Annual Review for 1948, pp. 4.

lxv FO 371/68788 Eastern 1948 Saudi Arabia file number 9684 British Embassy Jedda participation of Saudi Troops in the Fighting in Palestine. 11 July 1948.

lxv FO 371/68788 Eastern 1948 Saudi Arabia file number 357  from Trott, Jedda 31 October 1948.

lxvi Abdulrahim Jamous al-lijan al-shabiyya limusaadat mujahidi filistin fi al-mamlaka al-arabiyya al-saudiyya  Riyadh: al-Dara 1422, pp. 19-20.

lxvii Madawi Al-Rasheed a History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.

lxviii E 2805/2805/25 Saudi Arabia Annual Report 147, p. 40-41

lxix A major concern was the question of the air base at Dhahran, maintained by the United States Air Force  under an agreement which was due to expire in 1949. Although Ibn Saud did not want the Americans to withdraw, he wanted to obtain the best possible terms in return for granting the Americans the right to remain in occupation. See FO 371/75505 Saudi Arabia Annual Review 1948, p. 6

lxx E 2805/2805/25 Saudi Arabia Annual Report 147, p. 68-69

lxxi E 2805/2805/25 Saudi Arabia Annual Report 147, p.69

lxxii FO 371/75505 Saudi Arabia: Annual Review 1948, p.5

lxxiii Ibid.

This expansion has recently become the subject of debate and controversy. The ‎conference aims to highlight the parameter of this expansion and its ‎consequences on the receiving societies, world politics, the intellectual and ‎religious public spheres, local social and cultural developments, and international ‎relations.  ‎

The conference brings together scholars and policy makers from Europe, the ‎USA, Asia and the Middle East. In two days of open discussions among ‎commentators from a variety of perspectives, contemporary trends of Saudi ‎expansion will be examined, exploring their roots as well as likely future ‎development and consequences. ‎

The multiplicity of perspectives and areas of expertise brought to bear on these ‎questions should allow a balanced understanding of the phenomenon. The ‎conference will no doubt re-evaluate and challenge many of the current literature ‎on Saudi expansion and connections with the world. ‎

This first conference will focus on the general aspects of Saudi expansion with ‎the hope that later more focused workshops will follow to map Saudi connections ‎in specific local contexts in the Arab-Muslim worlds and the West. ‎

PART I: SAUDI CONNECTIONS:  GENERAL OVERVIEW

This sections aims to provide a general forum that situates Saudi expansion in its ‎historical context. Relevant questions include

To what extent is Saudi expansion a product of local Saudi concerns for ‎legitimacy?‎

To what extend is Saudi expansion a product of the weakening of other regional ‎Arab powers that had in the past more acumen and intellectual heritage to play a ‎leading role in initiating political, social and religious connections?‎

To what extent is this expansion a product of the weakening of Arab society and ‎civil institutions in general and economic underdevelopment?‎

To what extent is this expansion a product of Western encouragement and ‎promotion of Saudi Arabia as a crucial player in regional, local and world politics?‎

The session focuses on the historical and structural factors both in Saudi Arabia ‎and the Arab, Muslim and Western worlds that paved the way for this unexpected ‎Saudi expansion. Furthermore, it assesses the receptiveness of constituencies ‎and the open door policies, allowing Saudi expansion unprecedented presence in ‎very distant locations. This sheds light on both old and new mediators (Western, ‎Arab, Saudi) through whom Saudi expansion is enforced in distant lands, for ‎example cultural brokers, economic and political entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and ‎other agencies.  ‎

PART II: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONNECTIONS

Since the oil boom of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia began to initiate its own ‎connections in the world, through political alliances with Western democracies, ‎Arab regimes or  co-optation of oppositions to these regimes. Papers should ‎examine Saudi involvement in world and Arab affairs in the cold and post cold ‎war periods; special emphasis is put on the consequences of this involvement in ‎the hot spots of the world, from Latin America to the Arab world, Africa and Asia. ‎Saudi  direct and indirect interventions in several regions are analysed. ‎

In addition, oil wealth was used to penetrate world markets, either as remittances ‎immigrants sent to their home countries or as direct investments in these ‎countries. In some instances the flow of oil remittances to developing countries ‎has had the effect of distorting and skewing economic and social development. ‎This is a matter that requires deliberate attention. ‎

The aim here is to map Saudi political and economic expansion and assess its ‎consequences on the receiving societies and world economies. Special ‎emphasis is put on Saudi monopolies and their socio-economic impact in the ‎world. ‎

‎ ‎

PART III: RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL EXPANSION

One of the most noticeable areas of Saudi expansion is the significance of Saudi ‎religious transnational penetration of the Arab world, Africa, Asia, Europe and ‎North America. This is experienced in several areas, for example religious ‎preaching, educational programmes, charitable organisations, pan-Arab and pan-‎Islamic bureaucracies, and religious patronage networks. Papers should address ‎aspects of this expansion, its consequences on the receiving societies, its role in ‎altering local manifestations of piety, religious worship and practice, and its effect ‎on religious pluralism, sectarian conflict, competition and violence. ‎

Together with religious expansion comes the alteration of local social traditions, ‎norms, and patters of social behaviour either through the media, return migration ‎and tourism. Papers should address consequences of for example the import of ‎the “Saudi way of life”-  by Arab expatriates. Saudi expansion combined  ‎contradictory strands, including both conservative and more lax manifestations. ‎This raises questions related to the impact of these contradictions on local ‎tradition, customs, gender relations, marriage patterns, social styles, tourist ‎destinations (in the West and the Arab world) and other relevant areas of the ‎social sphere.  ‎

‎ PART IV: CULTURAL EXPANSION

The above areas are accompanied by an obvious and aggressive Saudi ‎appropriation of the Arab and Western media, which resulted in the demise of old ‎local journalistic genres, especially those associated with historical centres such ‎as Beirut and Cairo. Since the 1970s, it is argued by some observers that Saudi ‎control of the Arab media has stifled diversity and pluralism, and influenced Arab ‎journalists and thinkers in many ways. Papers should examine the impact of ‎Saudi appropriation of Arab media voices, publishing houses, and Arab public ‎opinion. Furthermore, western media and the co-optation of journalistic voices in ‎the West have a tremendous impact on local practices, freedom of expression, ‎and other journalistic traditions. Direct Saudi pressure on Western media or self ‎censorship by this media have become obvious practices among journalists who ‎would prefer not to undermine their access to sources of information, often ‎controlled by Saudi Arabia. ‎

Since the 1990s and the advent of new communication technology (for example ‎satellite television and electronic media), Saudi control of main media providers ‎and outlet needs to be assessed and its consequences documented. The long ‎term effect of this trend in generating new styles, tastes, and opinions, which may ‎or may not correspond to local aspirations is worth exploring.  One area to be ‎noted is the paradoxical role of Saudi expansion, which has generated two ‎contradictory outcomes. A strong religious undertone, deemed inappropriate for ‎certain Arab contexts (for example fatwa and dawa programmes) is combined ‎with blunt and vulgar entertainment (for example video clips, Rotana, ‎entertainment and chat shows), condemned by many Arab audiences as ‎corrupting and inappropriate. Papers should address the contradictions in Saudi ‎media projects that may have serious  social consequences in specific localities. ‎

Another area of great relevance is the impact of Saudi expansion on academics, ‎intellectuals and others who are engaged in cultural production and the shaping ‎of the public sphere in various regions. Through generous rewards and ‎association with Saudi funded Western and Arab research centres and forums, a ‎new genre of academic and intellectual productions appear in London, ‎

Conference programme

‎6-8 SEPTEMBER 2007‎

Venue: Council Room, King’s College, Main Building, Strand ‎

DAY 1: Thursday 6 September ‎

AFTERNOON 4.00pm-7.45pm‎

‎4.00-5.00pm: Registration (King’s College, Council Room)‎

‎5.00-5.30pm:  Madawi Al-Rasheed Welcome and Introduction

‎5.30-7.45pm:  Panel 1 Historical Perspectives (Chair: Madawi Al-Rasheed)‎

‎5.30-6.15pm Hamadi Redissi   Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources ‎‎1745-1932‎

‎6.15-7.00pm Nelida Fuccaro Between Imarah, Empire and Oil: Saudis in the ‎Frontier Society of the Persian Gulf ‎

‎7.00-7.45pm Fawaz Trablsi Saudi Expansion: The Lebanese Connection 1920-‎‎1952‎

‎8.00pm Dinner ‎

DAY 2: Friday 7 September  ‎

MORNING 9am- 1.00pm ‎

Panel 2: Political and Economic Connections (Chair: Nelida Fuccaro)‎

‎9.00-9.45am Paul Aarts Saudi-European Relations: Politics, Economics and the ‎Environment

‎9.45-10.30am Robert Vitalis The Al-Saud as a Covert Agency of American ‎Empire

‎10.30-11.15am Asad Abu Khalil Motives and Features of Saudi Policy in ‎Lebanon ‎

‎11.15-11.30am Coffee Break‎

‎11.30-12.15 Toby Jones  Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Global Development

‎1.00-2.00pm Lunch at King’s College London‎

AFTERNOON 2.00-7.00pm‎

‎2.00-2.45pm Roger Hardy Ambivalent Ally: Saudi Arabia and the “War on ‎Terror” ‎

Panel 3: Religious Expansion (Chair: Aziz al-Azmeh)‎

‎2.45-3.30pm Saed Shihabi The Role of Religious Ideology in the Expansionist ‎Policies of Saudi Arabia

‎3.30-3.45 Coffee Break   ‎

Panel 3  Religious Expansion (Chair: Aziz al-Azmeh)‎

‎3.45-4.30pm Eleanor Doumato The Saudi Public School Religious Curriculum: ‎Unreformed and in Retreat?‎

‎4.30-5.15pm Madawi Al-Rasheed The Minaret and the Saudi Palace: ‎Obedience at Home and Rebellion Abroad

‎5.15-6.00pm Faisal Devji The “Arab” in Global Militancy‎

‎6.00-6.45pm  Roel Meijir Yusuf al-Uyari and the Jihadi Salafist Transnational ‎Expansion

‎8.00pm Dinner ‎

DAY 3 SATURDAY 8 SEPTEMBER ‎

MORNING 9.00am-1.00pm‎

Panel 3  Religious Expansion (Continued)  (Chair: Madawi Al-Rasheed)‎

‎9.00-9.45am Noorhaidi Hasan From Apolitical Quietism to Jihadist Activism: ‎Salafi Dawa Movement, Wahhabi Campaign and Political Violence in Indonesia

‎9.45-10.30am Salwa Ismail Producing “Reformed Islam”: A Saudi-American ‎Joint Venture

‎10.30-11.15am Irfan Alawi Wahhabi Destruction of the Heart of Islam

‎11.15-11.30 Coffee Break‎

‎11.30-12.15 Laurent Bonnefoy Salafism in Yemen: a Saudization?‎

‎12.15-1pm Mark Johnson In the footsteps of the Prophet: sociality and the ‎religious imagination among Muslims from South East Asia working in Saudi ‎Arabia.‎

‎1.00-2.00 Lunch at King’s College‎

AFTERNOON 2.00-7.00pm ‎

Panel 4 Media and Cultural Connections (Chair: Salwa Ismail)‎

‎2.00-2.45pm  Ali Al-Atassi  Petrodollar Making Public Opinion: Saudi Arabian ‎Media

‎2.45-3.30pm Hachem Saleh Saudi Arabia in the Eyes of Western Intellectuals

‎3.30-4.15pm Coffee Break‎

‎4.15-5.00pm Mai Yamani The Globalization of Saudi Morality: Petrodollar and ‎the Arab Press

‎5.00-5.45pm Noha Mellor Saudi Monopoly on the Arab Media‎

‎5.45-6.30pm Andrew Hammond Saudi Arabia’s Expanding “Cordon Sanitaire” in ‎the Arab Media: Challenges and Aims

‎6.30-7.30pm Round Table ‎

 

For over fifty years, U.S-Saudi relationship proved to rest not only on oil but also on two other important factors, geostrategic interests and Saudi religious identity, hence the title ‎‎“Thicker than Oil”.  In addition to oil, Saudi Arabia was important for the U.S because of its location and religious ideology. Since the Second World War, the U.S sought a military ‎presence in the Kingdom. The Dhahran airfield, proposed in 1944, shortened the air route to the Pacific. When this location provided unlimited capacity to refuel, Saudi Arabia ‎became extremely important for American overseas policies and expansionist projects. Since then Saudi territories became a transit hub for American commercial and military ‎interests. With the loss of Iran in 1979 after the Iranian Islamic revolution, America relied more and more on Saudi strategic territory for its overseas adventures.  ‎

Saudi religious outlook also proved to be a useful instrument in America’s foreign policy. Saudi Arabia’s extensive proselytizing of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam was not a ‎source of considerable concern because it had an anti-Communist justification, writes Bronson. In fact religion was a crucial factor cementing the U.S.-Saudi partnership. America ‎enlisted Saudi Islam to fight its own enemies and the enemies of capitalist expansion not only in the Arab but also the Muslim world. Bronson introduces  a factor, rarely mentioned ‎in international relations studies into the equation of inter-state relations.  Saudi Arabia’s religious identity, now contested and even detested in the U.S was mobilised to fight ‎America’s wars. This religious identity in the form of a fringe interpretation within Islam, proved to be crucial for defeating Communism during the Cold War,  thus culminating in ‎the collapse of the Soviet Union after the Afghan Jihad, in which many Saudis and other Muslims participated. Without Saudi oil and religious mobilisation, the project of defeating ‎Communism would not have been achieved in regions where it was least expected to be thwarted. ‎

In Riyadh, U.S support was seen as a shield against subversive ideologies that flourished in the Arab world, including Communism and nationalism espoused by Arab regime that ‎endorsed them. Mutual interests, therefore, consolidated a partnership that was founded on multiple layers rather than the single factor of oil. ‎

The oil thesis is not new since many international relations observers had already explained the partnership in terms of this factor. The novelty of the book lies in documenting how ‎the three pillars of the partnership, namely Oil, location and religion, served to maintain a unique relationship between two unlikely partners.  ‎

There is substantial documentation and evidence cited in support of Bronson’s thesis about the combination of oil, location and religion, all made Saudi Arabia an important hub for ‎U.S. national interest. Bronson lifts the veil on the secretive and sometimes too intimate adventures and awkward cross-cultural encounters between the leaderships of two countries ‎separated by religion and political culture but united by their intrigues to maintain their own respective interests, which at times contradicted the aspirations of substantial sections of ‎the population on both sides.  Many in the U.S regarded Saudi Arabia as a backward fanatical and undemocratic place where one can only do business while in Saudi Arabia America ‎is seen as a morally bankrupt society with a biased political position in favour of Israel. Against such stereotypes a controversial partnership which in recent years became ‎increasingly difficult to camouflage, justify or maintain, developed and was consolidated by successive American presidents and Saudi kings. Since the 1950s America sought to ‎transform  Saudi kings into  globally recognised Muslim leaders for its own interests, as long as Riyadh was willing  to spend its revenues in American-supported causes. This ‎willingness which was proved and enforced with every regional crisis earned Saudi Arabia  considerable favour at the highest levels of leadership in Washington. ‎

Thicker than Oil traces the historical development of the partnership since its inception in the 1950s. Each of the thirteen chapters documents an episode in the evolution of the ‎relationship. Bronson stops at regional crisis in Palestine, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, the Horn of Africa, Angola,  and many other locations to document the excesses and ‎sometimes the folly of this partnership.  Throughout the case studies of these varied and complex regional conflicts and international crises, the Saudi-American connection seems to ‎be prominent in shaping the outcome apparently in favour of both but in reality too complicated to be classified as an absolute success story. ‎

Bronson argues that the September 11 attacks exposed Americans to the dark underside of the U.S-Saudi relations. Perhaps this is true but people on the receiving end of this unholy ‎alliance  where U.S-Saudi co-operation was enacted must have been aware of some of the detrimental consequences.  Americans must have been the last to recognise the flaws and ‎the last to know. “We did America’s dirty work”, one Saudi told Bronson (pp. 237). This dirty work was bound to backfire as demonstrated in the book. The fragile and fractures ‎partnership needed the War on Terror to limp towards the future, in Bronson’s words. ‎

It is unfortunate that throughout the book Bronson uses ill-defined labels and names. For example, she refers to ‘battles’ between Saudi ‘pragmatist’ and ‘zealots’ without further ‎explanation. Sometimes, one may conclude that Saudis critical of U.S foreign policy are considered zealots, easily lumped together with militants and radical Jihadis. Similarly, ‎pragmatists are those who are likely to be practical rather than ideological in their evaluation of the partnership. Sometimes one wonders whether Bronson considers King Abdullah a ‎pragmatic leader while his brother Minister of Interior Naif a zealot, since he is more ‘willing to cater to society’s most conservative elements’ (pp. 246). Similarly, is Prince Turki ‎al-Faisal, now Saudi Ambassador in Washington, who carried out U.S policy in Afghanistan a pragmatist or a zealot? Was he pursuing Saudi national interests in Qandahar or an ‎American war on Communist Russia? Or were the two the same? Bronson hopes that Prince Salman, whom Bronson describes as a pragmatic prince, would revive the U.S-Saudi ‎partnership if appointed second deputy prime minister. If the post goes to the ‘conservative’ prince Naïf, Bronson anticipates a worsening of the relationship. Sections of the book ‎where such labels are thrown without serious consideration of the roles the various princes play in the Saudi polity tend to be superficial and can easily slip into unfounded ‎assumptions and superficial wishful thinking. Bronson thinks in terms of a partnership based on intimate relations between individuals rather than between nations. The partnership ‎then becomes entirely dependent on whether so-called zealots or pragmatists occupy the highest positions in the policy making hierarchy. We are not told in the book whether the ‎same applies in Washington. For example what are the prospect for U.S.-Saudi relations if policy makers in Washington move from being zealots to being pragmatists or vice versa?   ‎

Another weakness in the book is Bronson’s assumption that terrorism is a product of classroom teaching material rather than the policies that she describes in over three hundred ‎pages.  Bronson admits that both the U.S and Saudi Arabia have contributed to today’s problems through sins of omission or commission but when she recommends solutions she ‎seems to forget the underlying causes she already identified. The problem for Bronson is the ‘financing of extremist thought’ rather than serious intrigues practised by both ‎successive American administration and Saudi princes, presidents, intelligence officers, royal confidants and others who are responsible for current security problems. The disputed ‎religious discourse that Bronson and many others identify as the source of terrorism is not new. It existed in the region for several centuries. It is only in recent times that this ‎discourse was re-appropriated by groups,  that saw in the U.S-Saudi partnership humiliation and subservience. The discourse that Bronson objects to seems to have been acceptable ‎when it was enlisted to fight America’s war during the Cold War as she considers religion one of the factors that endeared Saudi Arabia to the U.S. It is only when this discourse ‎turned against its original sponsors, both in Washington and Riyadh, that it became problematic. Perhaps it is better to turn attention to the sins of omission and commission, which ‎may actually prove more productive in fighting terrorism.             Reading the book, one comes to the conclusion that 9/11 was a disaster waiting to happen.  ‎

The book will appeal to policy makers and the general public. It is written in an accessible style weaving anecdotal evidence with documentation.  ‎