Professor Madawi Al Rasheed

Saudi Arabia is an ‘Islamised authoritarianism’. The system rests on propagating religious interpretations of the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet, which seek to anchor authoritarianism in the sacred tradition.

Several myths, propagated inside Saudi Arabia and outside it, continue to influence the way people assess the Saudi enigma.

One myth is the claim that the state reflects tribal coalitions. The reality is that today the only tribe which practices political tribalism in Saudi Arabia is that of the Al-Saud. Over the past 100 years the Al-Saud have evolved from being a family into being a tribe. Saudi society continues to hold onto the social and identity aspects of tribalism, but no political tribalism is evident. Sections of Saudi society adhere to the ethos of the tribe but do not exhibit the political aspect of tribalism.

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was perhaps the most difficult challenge facing the Saudi government since the Gulf War of 1990-1.  The invasion was unprecedented, unprovoked, and lacking in wide Arab and international support and in the name of threats --WMDs, links to al-Qaidah--which proved to have little credibility. Official Saudi Arabia wished to see Saddam and the Ba’th regime go, but feared the aftermath. It opted for an indecisive position, hiding behind a confused rhetoric of open objections to the war in regional Arab meetings and forums and implicit approval, and even important co-operation in allowing US military command centres to conduct the war from its own territory. The ramifications of the swift collapse of the Ba’thist regime as a result of military intervention, without UN sanctions, has set up a precedent which could have serious consequences for Saudi Arabia and the whole of the Middle East. 

As Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon is allowed to enter its second week, Saudi statements continue to condemn Hizb Allah’s adventurism, which they hold responsible for the ensuing death and destruction in Lebanon. Enraged Muslims, including some Saudis, have interpreted this un-fraternal madness as yet another case of Saudi pandering to the US and its allies. On closer inspection, this view appears superficial. The real source of Saudi condemnation is a much deeper fear of Hizb Allah, who is seen to represent a much greater threat than Israel itself.

On 23 June this year, Saudis in Riyadh’s al-Nakhil neighbourhood woke up to count several bodies drenched in blood after a street battle between Jihadis and security forces.

Such scenes have become familiar to the residents of Saudi cities, and the interior ministry spokesman announced that the battle marked a victory over the group “that has gone astray” – the contemporary Kharijites of the Saudi regime, who have turned sleepy neighbourhoods into battlegrounds.

Luther fought against ecclesiastical abuse, indulgences and papal authority. He also advocated the doctrine of ‘justification by faith alone’. By nailing his ninety-five theses to the door of the Wittenberg Cathedral, he changed the history of Europe forever.

After 9/11, politicians, research centres and think tanks in the West wished that a Saudi Luther would emerge to free Islam from so-called ‘radical interpretations’ and ‘preachers-of-hate’. Both the US and the Saudi regime hoped that the emergence of a Luther would deliver Saudis from the grip of radicalism and into the arms of tolerance.

Political activism in Saudi Arabia manifests itself in the form of petitions. These are sent to the King and other senior members of the royal family, and in the absence of independent and legal forums, these petitions attract media attention and are an important means by which the political atmosphere can be tested.

The country was struck by a wave of petitions during and after the Gulf War in the early 1990s. There followed the arrest of signatories – who at that time were mainly Islamists – and the imposition of great restrictions on freedom of speech. Then, in March 1992, the government introduced new cosmetic reforms – the Basic Law of Government, the Law of the Provinces, and the Law of the Consultative Council – which were presented as great steps towards change in the Kingdom.

The ‘shepherd’ whose guidance and leadership Saudi religious scholars in the past called upon the population to follow, is no more. It is not the case that nobody is fulfilling this role. Instead, a leadership which was once identifiable in the person of a single individual is now diffuse, having been divided between the five most powerful leaders: King Abdullah and his four most powerful brothers or their children.

This change was consolidated under the reign of King Fahd, but was sealed when Abdullah became king. With his primacy as head of state, but also with his control of the National Guard and the tribal population that constitutes the bulk of this paramilitary force, King Abdullah controls a formidable part of the Saudi power structure.

But existing alongside the power of the monarch are those grouped around Prince Nayef, the interior minister. Employing 500,000 people, they control the security and intelligence apparatus, and demand total loyalty from every official. As powerful – in part thanks to budget which is thought have topped $18bn in 2004 – are those led by Prince Sultan, the defence minister and Crown Prince.