Professor Madawi Al Rasheed

Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia
by George Rentz. London Arabian Publishing, 2005 Pp.xlii+275, bibliography, index.  xxxxx(cloth), ISBN 09544792 2 X

Since the 11 September the Saudi regime launched a serious public relations campaign to rescue its reputation in the West and that of its religious establishment. While print and visual media remain the most important platform for this campaign in the West, Saudi sponsored academic conferences and annual lectures in English proved to be equally important as these quasi-academic activities influence a different audience. 

David Commins The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia London: I.B. Tauris 2006, pp. 276, ISBN 1 845 11 080, Hardback £39.50
Tim Niblock Saudi Arabia Power, Legitimacy and Survival London: Routledge 2006, pp. 206, ISBN 10 0-415 30310 9, Paperback £19.99

Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid National Security in Saudi Arabia Threats, Responses, and Challenges Centre for Strategic and International Studies and Westport: Praeger Security International 2005, pp. 426, ISBN 0-275 98811 2 Hardback

Dependence on Saudi oil and strategic location in the heart of a volatile Arab region made this country the centre of academic interest in the second half of the twentieth century. Since 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia itself, the country received further focused attention. Researchers flooded to Saudi Arabia to investigate its history, society, religion and security challenges.

1744-2003, Paris: La Decouverte.

It is a well known fact that Arabian studies have been dominated by Anglo-Saxon scholarship, reflecting the historical, colonial and economic contexts of power relations in which academic discourse takes place. Throughout the twentieth century, English language publications dominated the sphere of knowledge and theorising about not only Saudi Arabia but the Arabian Peninsula in general. With the exception of two or three classical monographs and few traveller’s and colonial accounts, for example the monographs of Charles Huber and Robert Montagne, there has been little French academic engagement with Arabia up to the second World War. 

Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition.
London, I.B. Tauris 2003. Bibliography, index, pp. 181. Hardback.

The starting point for this book is the decision of Britain to withdraw from the Gulf in 1968 and the actual withdrawal in 1971. The central thesis states that no other superpower was ready to replace Britain in the Gulf at the time. The USA was occupied in Vietnam while the Soviet Union was still maintaining a cautious foreign policy. The author is strongly convinced that when British power was in decline, other superpowers never established unquestionable dominance or control over the region. Against this vacuum, politics in the Gulf went ‘local’, leaving Iran, the strongest and most ambitious and capable regional force to determine and reorder the political landscape. Therefore, the book argues that after British withdrawal, the new Gulf order was achieved by emphasising local concerns, thus giving regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states) supremacy over external forces in shaping the politics of the area.

by Daryl Champion . London: Hurst and Company.  2003. Pp.xxii+392glossary, index, bibliography. £ 45 (cloth) , £16.95 (paper), ISBN 1-85065-647-9 casebound, 1-85065-668-1 paperback. 

The intimate connection between Saudi Arabia and oil not only influenced historical development in this country but also left its fingerprints on Western scholarly work in the humanities and social science disciplines. More than any other country in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia polarised the academic community and created a rift between those who justify its alleged ‘exceptionalism’ and those who condemn its archaic and odd social, political, religious and cultural traditions. In this polarised scholarly atmosphere sound interpretation tends to be the first casualty.  With a number of exceptions, indigenous research in general has not so far produced nuanced interpretations either.

Saudi Arabia is an ‘Islamised authoritarianism’. The system rests on propagating religious interpretations of the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet, which seek to anchor authoritarianism in the sacred tradition.

Several myths, propagated inside Saudi Arabia and outside it, continue to influence the way people assess the Saudi enigma.

One myth is the claim that the state reflects tribal coalitions. The reality is that today the only tribe which practices political tribalism in Saudi Arabia is that of the Al-Saud. Over the past 100 years the Al-Saud have evolved from being a family into being a tribe. Saudi society continues to hold onto the social and identity aspects of tribalism, but no political tribalism is evident. Sections of Saudi society adhere to the ethos of the tribe but do not exhibit the political aspect of tribalism.

The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was perhaps the most difficult challenge facing the Saudi government since the Gulf War of 1990-1.  The invasion was unprecedented, unprovoked, and lacking in wide Arab and international support and in the name of threats --WMDs, links to al-Qaidah--which proved to have little credibility. Official Saudi Arabia wished to see Saddam and the Ba’th regime go, but feared the aftermath. It opted for an indecisive position, hiding behind a confused rhetoric of open objections to the war in regional Arab meetings and forums and implicit approval, and even important co-operation in allowing US military command centres to conduct the war from its own territory. The ramifications of the swift collapse of the Ba’thist regime as a result of military intervention, without UN sanctions, has set up a precedent which could have serious consequences for Saudi Arabia and the whole of the Middle East. 

As Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon is allowed to enter its second week, Saudi statements continue to condemn Hizb Allah’s adventurism, which they hold responsible for the ensuing death and destruction in Lebanon. Enraged Muslims, including some Saudis, have interpreted this un-fraternal madness as yet another case of Saudi pandering to the US and its allies. On closer inspection, this view appears superficial. The real source of Saudi condemnation is a much deeper fear of Hizb Allah, who is seen to represent a much greater threat than Israel itself.

On 23 June this year, Saudis in Riyadh’s al-Nakhil neighbourhood woke up to count several bodies drenched in blood after a street battle between Jihadis and security forces.

Such scenes have become familiar to the residents of Saudi cities, and the interior ministry spokesman announced that the battle marked a victory over the group “that has gone astray” – the contemporary Kharijites of the Saudi regime, who have turned sleepy neighbourhoods into battlegrounds.

Luther fought against ecclesiastical abuse, indulgences and papal authority. He also advocated the doctrine of ‘justification by faith alone’. By nailing his ninety-five theses to the door of the Wittenberg Cathedral, he changed the history of Europe forever.

After 9/11, politicians, research centres and think tanks in the West wished that a Saudi Luther would emerge to free Islam from so-called ‘radical interpretations’ and ‘preachers-of-hate’. Both the US and the Saudi regime hoped that the emergence of a Luther would deliver Saudis from the grip of radicalism and into the arms of tolerance.

Political activism in Saudi Arabia manifests itself in the form of petitions. These are sent to the King and other senior members of the royal family, and in the absence of independent and legal forums, these petitions attract media attention and are an important means by which the political atmosphere can be tested.

The country was struck by a wave of petitions during and after the Gulf War in the early 1990s. There followed the arrest of signatories – who at that time were mainly Islamists – and the imposition of great restrictions on freedom of speech. Then, in March 1992, the government introduced new cosmetic reforms – the Basic Law of Government, the Law of the Provinces, and the Law of the Consultative Council – which were presented as great steps towards change in the Kingdom.

The ‘shepherd’ whose guidance and leadership Saudi religious scholars in the past called upon the population to follow, is no more. It is not the case that nobody is fulfilling this role. Instead, a leadership which was once identifiable in the person of a single individual is now diffuse, having been divided between the five most powerful leaders: King Abdullah and his four most powerful brothers or their children.

This change was consolidated under the reign of King Fahd, but was sealed when Abdullah became king. With his primacy as head of state, but also with his control of the National Guard and the tribal population that constitutes the bulk of this paramilitary force, King Abdullah controls a formidable part of the Saudi power structure.

But existing alongside the power of the monarch are those grouped around Prince Nayef, the interior minister. Employing 500,000 people, they control the security and intelligence apparatus, and demand total loyalty from every official. As powerful – in part thanks to budget which is thought have topped $18bn in 2004 – are those led by Prince Sultan, the defence minister and Crown Prince.